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Abstract

The Imposition of the Ego
Jean-Paul Sartre and the Cinematic Apparatus
by
James Driscoll, B.A.
DePaul University, 2013
Thesis Advisor: Michael DeAngelis
Committee: Luisela Alvaray

This thesis applies Jean-Paul Sartre’s early philosophy of consciousness and ego to two
main concepts of Jean-Louis Baudry’s theory of the cinematic apparatus. The first of these
concepts, the “transcendental subject,” is denoted by Baudry as the conflation of Cartesian
philosophy and technology which ensures the transmission of representational knowledge in line
with a historically dominant optical ideology. Since Sartre criticizes the transcendental
phenomenology of Husserl in ways similar to Baudry’s work, his structures and levels of
consciousness apply well to the enforced cohesion of the transcendental subject, and impart a
hitherto lacking cohesion to the concept. Following from a clear structuration of the
transcendental subject, the thesis then moves to the “more-than-real,” or the impression of reality
found in dream that is then objectively staged in the apparatus. For Baudry, dream enacts the
desire to endure unconscious representation in the same manner as waking perception, this desire
itself stemming from a wish to return to the pre-subjective wholeness of infancy. Cinema, then,
enacts an “artificial regression,” or a simulation of the regression required for dream, in order to
endure the more-than-real in waking reality. In order to explain the process of the more-thanreal, the transcendental subject is then schematized in its interaction with the general projection
situation and the spectator, from which is concluded that the transcendental subject engages with
the spectator in order to produce for the spectator a position in which to experience “reality
unfolding itself.” Finally, the implications for both materialist film, Althusserian ideology, and
the notion of “apparatus” in general are briefly explored.
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INTRODUCTION: THE RESUSCITATION OF A THEORY
This project will re-examine Jean-Louis Baudry’s concept of the “cinematic apparatus,”
not from a psychoanalytic perspective, with its emphasis on the unconscious, regression, and
dream, but a Sartrean perspective, with its emphasis on unreflected consciousness, reflected
consciousness, and ego. Firstly, I argue that the theory of the “transcendental subject,” or a
subject-effect based on a simulation of phenomenological consciousness, must be stressed and
clarified in Baudry’s work. While the metaphorical comparisons between cinema and dream
found in “The Apparatus” have drawn the most attention and criticism, little work has been done
on the philosophical structure of Baudry’s transcendental subject. Since psychoanalysis has
declined in popularity as an interpretive tool, the “subject” of “The Apparatus” and “Ideological
Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” has been relegated to a by-gone era of
metapsychological film theory. By revisiting the apparatus, I intend to show that there exists in
Baudry’s work a consistent philosophical system of consciousness that requires elucidation and
has consequences for other theoretical concerns, filmic or not. Finally, I argue that when the
subject of the apparatus is properly understood, the “impression of reality” produced by the
apparatus becomes clearer and provides new insight.
THEORY/POST-THEORY
Obviously, such an endeavor intervenes in a discourse rife with contentious history. The
concept of “the apparatus,” as well as those writers and theorists herded under its banner (often
glossed as “post-structuralist film theory”), are now largely seen as either discredited or simply
outmoded. As New Lacanian Todd McGowan puts it, “film theory today is almost nonexistent.
The universalizing claims about the cinematic experience made by figures such as Sergei
Eisenstein, André Bazin, Christian Metz, and Laura Mulvey have disappeared” (McGowan ix).
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As McGowan sees it, the current climate of film scholarship is comprised of local case studies
and “particular claims” that remain within specialized boundaries of interest. “Proffering a
universal and totalizing theory of the filmic experience,” he notes, “seems outdated and naïve”
(ix). Perhaps this atmosphere results from what Slavoj Žižek calls “a stance of profound political
resignation…a will to obliterate the traces and disappointments of political engagement,” an
engagement so integral to the intellectual efforts of 1960s/1970s film theory (Žižek 13). Perhaps
not. Whatever the reason, it does appear, as evidenced by some of the literature appraised in this
project, that film scholarship has largely turned away from the grand ideological critiques that
once dominated film studies (McGowan 1-5).
For McGowan, this trend finds its loci in a collection of essays entitled Post-Theory:
Reconstructing Film Studies, edited by noted film scholars David Bordwell and Noël Carroll
(McGowan 4-5, 212-13). The purpose of the anthology is to propose methods and theoretical
paradigms that differ from Marxist and psychoanalytic frameworks. Rhetorically implicit to
Post-Theory is a resolute indictment of “Grand Theory,” defined by Carroll as a mix of primarily
French authors and theorists filtered through and conglomerated by English-speaking critics
(Carroll, “PF” 37). Bordwell points to the four main offenses of Grand Theory: 1. Theory is
based upon a “top-down” and “doctrine driven” application of faddish French theory, resulting in
an “inadvertent narrowness” that produces minimally different analyses based on shared
assumptions (Bordwell 18-21); 2. Theory deploys a dilettante mix of writers and disciplines that
are only compatible through a strategy of imposed synthesis (21-22); 3. Grand Theorists “rely
upon remarkably unconstrained association,” eschewing reason and logic for flights of literary
metaphor (22-24); 4. Theory confuses filmic interpretation with evidence and verification of
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theoretical premises (24-26). Both Bordwell and Carroll consequently advocate the pluralistic,
localized interrogation of specific aspects of film (Bordwell 26-30; Carroll, “PF” 39, 56-61).
Aside from McGowan, Žižek provides the most explicit response to Post-Theory. In The
Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski Between Theory and Post-Theory, Žižek draws an
adversarial opposition between “‘Theory,’ (which, of course, is far from a unified field)” and
“‘Post-Theory,’ the cognitivist and/or historicist reaction to it” (Žižek 1). Žižek, himself an
avowed Lacanian-Marxist, first argues that Post-Theory, through its explicit criticism and
exclusion of psychoanalysis as an analytic paradigm, overdetermines the role of some mystic,
powerful Lacanian discourse in film studies: “Who are these Lacanians,” Žižek asks, implicitly
accusing Post-Theorists of fabricating a psychoanalytic politburo (1). Secondly, Žižek criticizes
Carroll’s prescription that film theory be fundamentally “dialectic;” for Žižek, Carroll’s use of
the term does not result in Hegelian synthesis but is rather “unending, so that no theory can claim
to provide the ultimate standpoint” (Carroll, “PF” 56-59, Žižek 14-15). It is not that Žižek
believes there need be a new Grand Theory (although he resides within prescriptive discursive
fields), but that this type of dialectic is non-political, removed as it is from any being-in-theworld (engagement aimed at synthesis, i.e. change) and enunciated from a position of
institutional authority and knowledge. For Žižek, Carroll effectively says, “Theory is neverending because I have already pronounced its final answer: there is no final answer.” The result
is endless academic exegesis.
These objections have themselves been disputed. In “Slavoj Žižek: Say Anything,”
Bordwell criticizes Žižek for (a) representing Post-Theory as emblematic of some sort of
sustained, hostile intellectual movement, (b) pretending as though the attacks wagered by the
likes of Bordwell and Carroll are themselves based on unfounded, hyperbolic notions of a
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monolithic Lacanian discourse, and (c) failing to actually counter any of the arguments made
against Theory in the Post-Theory volume (davidbordwell.net). For example, in response to
Žižek’s “Who are these Lacanians,” Bordwell writes, “Žižek knows perfectly well that a great
many film scholars have cited Lacan and used his work to bolster theoretical or interpretive
claims.” Furthermore, Bordwell asks, “Why do Žižek and [Colin] MacCabe [who provides the
book’s introduction] elevate a single anthology (Post‑Theory) into a movement (Post‑Theory)?”
Bordwell further accuses Žižek of using invective rhetoric to (unsuccessfully) degrade PostTheory, and of regurgitating established Theory doctrine without any justification or reply to its
critics.
In order to establish my position within the Theory/Post-Theory debate, I offer an
interpolation of Bordwell’s reproach of Žižek: Bordwell knows perfectly well that in graduate
programs across the nation, not only has Theory been pronounced dead, its corpse is constantly
exhumed and berated in order to exacerbate decay borne of premature demise. Through this reexamination of the apparatus, I aim to show that there is still work to be done, and that, if I am
not attempting a “comeback” of Theory, I am stating resolutely that the apparatus is worth
revisiting. Žižek does not have to be correct in his accusation of Post-Theory’s political apathy
for there to exist a climate that is unreasonably antithetical to grand, less localized theories of
film and film consciousness. As McGowan, speaking of psychoanalysis and Post-Theory, puts it,
Though the contributors to Post-Theory lament the privileged status of
psychoanalysis within film theory, their attack comes about twenty years after the
height of its popularity. Given the current position of psychoanalysis within film
theory, Post-Theory is flogging a dead horse. In fact, it is psychoanalytic theory’s
very lack of popularity—its weakened, degraded state—that has occasioned this
attack. One attacks an authority not for its strength but for its weakness.
(McGowan 219)
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A further exigency of this project is rooted in a more fundamental debate over knowledge
and the legitimacy of method. In “The Bordwell Regime and the Stakes of Knowledge,” Robert
Ray invokes the distinction between classicist and baroque science in order to better explain the
contempt held by Bordwell et. al for “post-structuralist” approaches to film (Ray 32-33).
Bordwell (here standing in for the Post-Theory slant) represents classicist science, with its
penchant for singular method, rigorous research, and conclusions that are verifiable by available
data (35). Post-structuralism, on the other hand, represents the baroque, as it emphasizes style,
form, and “an aptitude for inconclusiveness” (32-33). Obviously the rhetoric of Baudry belongs
to the latter category; his essays are full of momentary digressions that, while appearing to
contain a bevy of meaning, remain unexplained and therefore cryptic. It is this latter approach to
the theorizing of film that Ray argues has been outmoded at the behest of a classicist revival in
the institution of American academia (40-41).
However, as Ray points out, “both classicism and the baroque produce knowledge. The
questions are how? and what kind?” (Ray 33). At the moment, 1970s theory has been rejected as
productive of knowledge for numerous reasons, some of which are outlined above: it is too
eclectic; its writing style is unreasonably oblique; it fails to possess a serious methodology; etc.
In short, “Theory” cannot produce proper knowledge in the current academic climate because it
is not classicist. It is, rather, aphoristic, esoteric, and lofty. Its concepts remain necessarily
inconclusive. But as Ray reminds us, aphorisms, turns of phrases, and stylistic dalliances can
inspire formidable intellectual endeavors (51-53). As he puts it,
Contrary, then, to Bordwell’s complaints about the “[r]eliance on vaporous
formulas rather than explicitly constructed concepts and propositions,” this
constitutive vocabulary’s inchoateness should not count against [Theory]; in fact,
its very imprecision fosters a “learning disposition,” that impulse toward
knowledge that originates in vaguely motivated but urgent desire. (51)
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It is the “urgent desire” of this project to interrogate the work of Baudry in order to rescue it
from undue classicist damnation. While his essays certainly embody the baroque belief that
aphorism, aside, and belles lettres in general can produce worthy knowledge, I see no reason
why that should warrant a total abandonment of his project. To reject Baudry’s work on the basis
of classicist bias entails a tragic loss of potent philosophical content that may help us better grasp
the notion of film consciousness.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
From Phenomenology to the Analytic Subject
Much like Lacan’s implicit analytic project of “reducing the privileges of the
consciousness,” Baudry and film theorists of his time sought to debunk the “idealist belief in the
homogeneity of all Being and the transcendent subject who can view it from afar” (Lacan 82, Jay
473). Martin Jay points out that “phenomenological realism,” or the belief, propagated by André
Bazin and his followers, that cinema unites subject and object in a phenomenological reduction
that objectively frames the life-world, “was often surrounded by an aura of religiosity and
Platonic idealism that would not easily survive the intensifying politicization of film criticism in
the late 1960s” (461).1 Baudry and the apparatus therefore occupy a specific historical moment
in film theory in which one theory of consciousness gains preference over another and political
concerns (namely, those of ideology) explicitly enter the fore of film discourse.
As phenomenological realism comes to be rejected, then, a new focus on “the subject”
and its construction emerges. In the introduction to Camera Obscura’s translation of “The
Apparatus,” Betrand Augst argues that “technology cannot explain cinema. The cinema-effect
can only be explained from the view-point of the apparatus, an apparatus which is not limited to
the instrumental base but also includes the subject” (Augst 100). Baudry’s work therefore
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occupies, critically, a philosophical tradition dedicated to understanding subjectivity. “The
apparatus” is not simply an imposed, ideological technology base that equivocally colonizes the
minds of its spectators, but instead involves the simulation and production of structures of
consciousness. “For Baudry,” Augst states further, “the cinematographic apparatus is a
simulation apparatus, but an apparatus that simulates a subject-effect, or a state, not reality”
(100).
It is this simulation of a “subject-effect” which must be stressed and re-examined in order
to properly understand Baudry and the apparatus. Joan Copjec points out that the English word
“apparatus” can actually originate from two different French terms: appareil or dispositf. The
former usually refers to a literal machine or device, whereas the latter term refers not only to
mechanics but a mechanics with “an adherence to a philosophical tradition…which sets itself
against the empiricist position that facts exist outside the science that discovers them” (Copjec,
“AIM” 57). For apparatus theory, then, the technology of cinema is inherently ensnared within a
certain philosophical bias and reproduces modes of perception in line with that bias. As Jay
points out, “the claim that film technology was neutral and based on advances in pure science
was precisely what apparatus theory set out to dispute” (Jay 471). In other words, there is no
such thing as an “innocent” technology; as Baudry says of “the technical nature of optical
instruments,” “their scientific base assures them a sort of neutrality and avoids their being
questioned” (Baudry, “IE” 40).
What, however, is left unquestioned? For Baudry, it is the belief in, and simulation of,
omnipotent phenomenological consciousness. This is the point at which “the apparatus” as
mechanics, “the apparatus” as a philosophical understanding of the subject, and the cause-effect
relation between the two all merge to clarify the stakes of apparatus theory and its reappraisal in
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this project. In The Imaginary Signifier, Christian Metz briefly stages a simultaneously neutral
and critical dialogue between psycho-semiotic film theory and the prior phenomenological slant:
The ‘there is’ of phenomenology proper (philosophical phenomenology) as an
ontic revelation referring to a perceiving-subject (=‘perceptual cogito’), to a
subject for which alone there can be anything, has close and precise affinities with
the installation of the cinema signifier in the ego as I have tried to define it, with
the spectator drawing into himself as a pure instance of perception, the of the
perceived being ‘out there’. To this extent the cinema really is the
‘phenomenological art’ it has often been called, by Merleau-Ponty himself, for
example. But it can only be so because its objective determinations make it so.
(Metz 53, emphasis mine)
Metz explicitly argues here that it is an objective “determination,” perhaps one could say a
technological simulation, of phenomenological consciousness, which makes cinema appear
idealist, appear as expressive of wholeness between being and consciousness, and so on. The
crucial crux of this argument, however, is that for Metz, Baudry, and apparatus theory, that
philosophical system which has been simulated is not the way in which humans, conscious or
unconscious, actually interact with the world (53). Metz believes, in tow with structuralism, that
the subject of phenomenology cannot see the reality of its situation. Hence, much like the
structuralist-Marxist refutation of phenomenology and the efforts of Lacan to “de-privilege”
consciousness, Metz, albeit with sympathy and nuance, criticizes phenomenology in favor of
psychoanalysis (and its emphasis on projection, identification, the mirror stage, etc.) at the same
instant he calls for questioning and criticism of cinema:
In other words, phenomenology can contribute to knowledge of the cinema (and it
has done so) insofar as it happens to be like it, and yet it is on the cinema and
phenomenology in their common illusion of perceptual mastery that light must be
cast by the real conditions of society and man. (53)
Why Sartre?
It is here that the need for Sartre begins. Baudry’s work on the apparatus is located
precisely in this problematic identified by Metz, and, especially in “Ideological Effects,” Baudry
8

attempts a critical investigation of the structural affinities between the apparatus and
phenomenological consciousness. Much like Metz, he finds phenomenologists, namely Husserl,
to be descriptors of a process by which Western epistemology has erred in assuming an
ontological whole prior to experience, known as the “transcendental ego” (Baudry, “IE” 43-46).
Like Metz, Baudry believes that le dispositif has determined l’appareil. However, as noted
above, during the turn from Bazinian film theories to a political/psychoanalytic impetus, the
terms “phenomenology” and “idealism” become unduly conflated and, although Baudry
references Husserl in his essay, their nuances are not treated as thoroughly as they could be.
Rather than simply agree with the contention, propagated by Baudry and Metz, that the subject
simulated by the apparatus is at odds with the actuality of human subjective experience, this
project asks: What if the subject of the apparatus is in fact “like” the phenomenological subject
of the life-world, and what if its very simulation produces ideological effects and problematics
concerning the impression of reality? What happens if we approach the apparatus from the
standpoint of Sartrean phenomenology?
While the philosophical system laid out in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego (TOE)
will be explained and utilized in a subsequent chapter, it will do to enumerate some of the
reasons for a critique of the apparatus through the lens of Sartrean phenomenology:
1. Like apparatus theory, Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology is also explicitly
foregrounded as at odds with Husserlian thought; it is not regarded as orthodox phenomenology
(Sukale 80-100).
2. Following from number one, apparatus theory’s rejection of phenomenology in favor
of psychoanalysis ignores a crucial similarity between Baudry’s work and TOE, a text whose
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very purpose is to provide a phenomenology that has no need for a transcendental ego (Sartre
36).
3. The very problematics foregrounded by apparatus theory, such as that of “perceptual
mastery,” the false, inward unity of consciousness, the objective condensation of the ego, and so
on are all explicit concerns of existentialist philosophy as practiced by the early Sartre (Sartre 32,
37-38).
4. By the time structuralism had developed and proliferated in France, phenomenology
had been largely denoted as outmoded and incompatible with Marxism in its relation to the
structuralist revolution (Poster 306-340, Flynn 113-118). Therefore the applicability between
Sartre, structuralist Marxism (read: Althusser, a direct influence on Baudry), and film theory has
not been tested.
5. Lastly, there simply has never been a structural theory of film consciousness that has
relied on Sartrean phenomenology.
Through the use of a philosophy explicitly interested in critiquing the same concerns of
apparatus theory, what is understood by the latter as “the subject” is problematized and open for
reformulation. Furthermore, by actively adopting a philosophical position that is not Lacanian,
one may circumvent classic criticisms of the apparatus. For example, Bordwell emphasizes that
for “subject-position theory,” of which Baudry is considered a part, “the subject” is a space, or
position, in which knowledge (whether linguistic, historical, etc.) is attainable (Bordwell 6). It is
a position determined by social forces that exist prior to any “individual;” consequently for
subject-position theory, “subjectivity is not the human being’s personal identity or personality; it
is unavoidably social. It is not a pre-given consciousness; it is acquired. Subjectivity is
constructed through representational systems” (6). Apparatus theory, therefore, ultimately argues
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that “an individual,” that is, a biological being, and “a subject,” or a category which imparts such
a being its identity, are always somehow the same thing, regardless of temporality or cause-andeffect (8, 14-15). This is the height of theoretical determinism.
However, it is my appeal to Sartre’s early theory of consciousness, as well as the
emphasis on its simulation (as foregrounded by Metz), which I eventually argue legitimates the
determinism of the apparatus: the apparatus is the way it is because it simulates inherent aspects
of phenomenological consciousness that the spectator in fact possesses. It is not that subjectivity
is created by the apparatus; it is that the apparatus utilizes subjectivity in a specific manner. Once
structures of consciousness are simulated in a technological apparatus, that which is inherent to
human consciousness becomes formal and in-the-world in an objective way: for Baudry, this is
the camera and the “transcendental subject” it embodies (Baudry 43-44). Whereas the temporal
life-world is a spontaneous and irreversible tract of time, the apparatus, as conceived by Baudry,
objectifies the consciousness which inhabits this life-world and renders it static, constant, and
subject to a controlled irreversibility. In other words, the simulation of spontaneous
consciousness (defined by Sartre as “unreflected consciousness”) embodied by the apparatus
produces a “subject” that is simultaneously spontaneous and calculated, at once unreflected and
ego-centered. The apparatus simulates consciousness so as to render it an objective arena in
which to consider, and thus (re)produce, ideologically sound concepts and ideas of the lifeworld, all the while retaining a sense, and structure, of things as “just happening.”
THE MORE-THAN-REAL
It is this mixture of objectified subjectivity, condensed meaning, and seeming spontaneity
that produces the effect Baudry names the “more-than-real.” While we have spoken at length
about the transcendental subject and the need for its actual structuration, we have yet to touch on
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the analogous relationship drawn by Baudry between the impressions of reality found in dream
and cinema, both of which produce the more-than-real (albeit in different ways). For Baudry, the
more-than-real is the result of a certain regression through which one satiates a desire to return to
an undifferentiated state-of-being experienced in infancy. During that period, one’s
consciousness and being have yet to be separated from the exterior world, particularly the body
of the mother. Dream is a hallucinatory regression that facilitates the return to such a position, as
it simulates aspects of waking life and conflates them with unconscious representations. Since
this conflation is not actually subjected to the constraints of external reality, the impression of
reality of the dream takes on a heightened reality-effect, the more-than-real.
After illustrating how the cinema simulates the psychic regression of dream in a social
space, Baudry argues that cinema, like dream, involves “obtaining from reality a position, a
condition in which what is perceived would no longer be distinguished from representations”
(Baudry, “TA” 121). What this means, to return to the notion of things “just happening” in the
cinema, is that cinema offers the spectator, like the dreamer, the opportunity to experience within
the life-world a momentary suspension of the externality inherent to reality. The dreamer
experiences the representations of his or her unconscious as though they did not belong to him or
her, as though the representations had no bearing on their waking subjectivity as it perceives,
relates to, and accommodates the actions and agencies of others; in cinema, the spectator, within
the simulated regression of dream, experiences ideological representations as though they were
both of and not-of the self-contained world narrating itself on-screen, despite the presence of any
signified contradiction. As John Ellis puts it, in apparatus cinema “it seems as though reality is
telling itself” (Ellis 60). It is the interaction between the transcendental subject, the
representation, and the spectator that produces the cinematic more-than-real.
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While the two main components of this project—the transcendental subject and the morethan-real—have obviously been shown as abundant with complex histories, dense philosophical
structures, and sustained, formidable opposition, there still exists a way in which apparatus
theory has yet to be properly considered. These complexities perhaps find enunciation in Dr.
Brian O’Blivion’s speech on television, the brain, and reality:
The television screen is the retina of the mind’s eye. Therefore the television screen is a
part of the physical structure of the brain. Therefore whatever appears on the television
screen emerges as raw experience for those who watch it. Therefore television is reality,
and reality is less than television.
(Cronenberg 1983)
Although both this speech and Videodrome deal exclusively with television, the relations
between “raw experience,” mediation, and “reality” are direct concerns of Baudry and apparatus
theory. Through a rigorous and sustained re-evaluation of the psychic structure of the apparatus,
the problematics inherent to apparatus theory, succinctly expressed in this excerpt, will be better
understood.
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN
Chapter One will outline Sartre’s philosophical system of consciousness found in TOE
and illustrate its affinity with the “transcendental subject” as constructed by Baudry in
“Ideological Effects.” Key concepts explained will be: unreflected consciousness; reflected
consciousness; ego; the non-positionality of consciousness and the positional objectivity of the
ego; intentionality. The chapter will explore the similarities and differences between the ways
Sartre and Baudry critique Husserl and the transcendental ego. Key to this chapter is the fact that,
for Sartre, the ego is always an objective locus in which spontaneity is lost in favor of a static
existence at the service of a false unity prior to existence (the transcendental ego). The argument
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of this chapter is that the construction of Baudry’s transcendental subject actually produces that
“false” prior unity; the “transcendental subject” is the formalization of the transcendental ego.
Chapter Two will then take this subject, as now understood in a Sartrean sense, and use it
to re-examine the “more-than-real” theorized in “The Apparatus.” I will argue that the notion of
an irreversible image tract in which the subject is unable to interfere, criticized most resolutely
by Carroll, is not to be taken metaphorically but seriously and even literally (Carroll, MM 13-31,
89-146). The apparatus produces the transcendental subject in order to stage a controlled
consideration of what experientially happens in the life-world, a consideration that is
nevertheless experienced as simulated abandon. Reality, in the apparatus, is the experience of the
reproduction of life-world conditions as though it were a revelation; through that experience is
produced the “more-than-real,” or a reality that is “really real.” With the relationship between the
transcendental subject, the spectator, and the more-than-real secured, Chapter Three will then
briefly apply the findings of Chapters one and two to the Althusserian theories of ideology and
the interpellated ideological subject.
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CHAPTER 1: THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
The term “transcendental subject” has already instanced itself several times in this
project, with no explanation or definition. What does it mean? Why would an ideological theory
of the cinema depend so greatly on its refutation?1 A simple definition is that the transcendental
subject is a subject-effect produced and embodied by a technological base that utilizes a certain
understanding of human subjectivity as the source material for its construction. The overall
consequence of the transcendental subject, so the theory goes, is that a certain epistemological
attitude towards the world, one in collusion with the capitalistic division of industrial society, is
reproduced through every instance of representation formed by the cinematic apparatus.
Still unclear, however, is the exact philosophical ground upon which such a theory is
built. For Baudry’s use of “transcendental,” and his ancillary concerns pertaining to the term, can
easily appear vague and even barely-connected. This is of course not the case: as I intend to
show, the construction of Baudry’s transcendental subject holds deep affinities with Sartre’s
criticism of the transcendental ego as a structuring mechanism of phenomenological
consciousness, and, in turn, his theory of the construction of the ego.2
With mention of the construction of the ego it will do to pause and make clear the
parameters of this chapter. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a clear structuration of the
transcendental subject of the cinematic apparatus. It will not depict the way in which that subject
functions to produce the cinematic ego of ideology; that production is integral to questions of the
impression of reality, the concept to which Chapter two is dedicated. As suggested by its very
name, this chapter sets out to construct the transcendental subject as the very condition for any
cinematic experience to be endured in the apparatus.
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A brief summary of Sartre’s stake in his rejection of the transcendental ego will therefore
help orient this chapter. A “transcendental ego,” in the phenomenology Sartre attacks, is that
pole which is said to precede and accompany every life-world experience. It is therefore a
condition of consciousness, or in and of consciousness. For Sartre, this is not so; rather, “we
should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is
outside, in the world” (Sartre 32). Sartre intends to show that rather than existing as an inhabitant
of consciousness, which would render it transcendental, the ego is an object of the world, an
object outside consciousness and therefore transcendent. It is an object produced, and its
production is both the result of activity on the part of consciousness and a seemingly “magical
bond,” but the ego is never transcendental, never primordial in any experience (68, 81).
This production, this “magical bond” of experience, consciousness, and ego will be taken
up in Chapter two. In that chapter, I take the transcendental subject, the condition of possibility
of apparatus experience, and illustrate the way that experience takes place. Central to that chapter
is the point that, whereas the transcendent ego can never precede any experience in the
phenomenological life-world, the ego of the apparatus always precedes cinematic experience
while still existing as a transcendent production. The transcendental subject exists to ensure the
constant production of an ego that coheres a central bed of ideological meaning that somehow
seems spontaneous and pre-personal.
For now, however, we will simply elucidate the structure of the transcendental subject.
THE STAKES OF “IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS”
At a glance, the phenomenologically-oriented reader notices many passing references
which immediately provoke a curious disposition, indeed a learning disposition, towards
Baudry’s essay “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” (“IE”). Regarding
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consciousness, Baudry clarifies that “in point of fact we are concerned with nothing less;” he
conflates his understanding of “the subject” and the (albeit, for him, psychoanalytic) idea of the
ego; he notes that with the construction of a cinematic transcendental subject, the world of
cinema will be constructed by and for that subject, bringing to mind the for-itself and in-itself
distinction so important for existentialism (Baudry 43, 46).3 His entire discussion of the
transcendental subject is riddled with phenomenological concepts, all cohering and dismantling
in a matter of moments and words.
What, then, are we to make of these references, these taut phrases brimming with
potential for both synthesis and further confusion? How are we to begin? Must we wrench these
words, force them to fit our arguments, or can we discern a theoretical trajectory that does not
eschew such confusion but rather utilizes it, indeed departs from it? A close reading of “IE” will,
hopefully, put to rest such queries and give some sense to the concepts contained within its
margins (if not completely eradicate their inherent friction).
The stakes of Baudry’s interrogation of the apparatus are concerned with the extent to
which its technological base reproduces capitalist ideology. Baudry asks,
do the instruments (the technical base) produce specific ideological effects, and are these
effects themselves determined by the dominant ideology? In which case, concealment of
the technical base will also bring about a specific ideological effect. Its inscription, its
manifestation as such, on the other hand, would produce a knowledge effect, as
actualization of the work process, as denunciation of ideology, and as critique of
idealism. (Baudry 41)
If the material work of the apparatus is foregrounded, knowledge, rather than ideology, will be
produced. This view is of course in tow with Baudry’s Althusserian position: the editors of Film
Quarterly note that “Althusser opposes ideology to knowledge as science. Ideology operates by
obfuscating the means by which it is produced. Thus an increase in ideological value is an
increase in mystification” (41).4
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The arguments by Baudry that follow are thus all related to the inherent tensions and
ambiguities contained within the above contention. Most important to note is that while Baudry
refers to “film” and “cinema” as a singular institution, and is arguing for their history and
operation as inherently ideological (“it is an apparatus destined to obtain a precise ideological
effect”), he is also trying to show why a material base that does not have to be idealistic (read:
ideological) is idealistic (Baudry 46). Although he never maps a prescriptive schema for a nondominant cinema, the very possibility of one remains clandestinely operative in his text. For at
times Baudry hints at the possibility for a cinema that is non-dominant, non-narrative;
predominately, however, he seems to argue for a teleological, deterministic pessimism. Recall
the relationship between the appareil and dispositif; while the power of the latter perhaps wins
the day in Baudry’s theoretical tale of ideological cinema, this is because that power has
somehow conquered a material base.
We therefore immediately reiterate and foreground the following, in order to guide the
ensuing discussion:
1. Baudry’s article is committed to an understanding of film-as-material, both in collusion
with and in spite of the ideology of the dispositif (Baudry 39-41).
2. That materiality is, in Baudry’s view, elided by the idealism of “dominant ideology” as
necessarily expressed and embodied by the technological base of the cinema.
3. This elision is carried out in service of “the maintenance of idealism,” or the
continuance of a dispositif that stresses a centered, structuring and constituting subject (40, 46).
THE “EYE-SUBJECT” OF PERSPECTIVE
In “IE,” Baudry provides a history of the construction of the artistic “subject,” or “a fixed
point by reference to which the visualized objects are organized” (Baudry 41). During the
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Renaissance, according to his narrative, the “discontinuous” and “heterogeneous” space of Greek
painting and theater was superseded by “perspective,” or “a conception of space formed by the
relation between elements which are equally near and distant from the ‘source of all life’” (41).5
Put simply, this equidistance ensures the perpetuation of an idealist dualism, based on lack, by
which meaning is secured as both immediate yet eternally elsewhere. The consequence of this
switch is thus a “hallucinatory reality” of representation in which the virtual coordinates of
perspective “[lay] out the space of an ideal vision and in this way [assure] the necessity of a
transcendence” (41). This “transcendence” can be glossed simply as a belief that, in art, the
ideological permutations of idealist consistencies such as Truth, Beauty, and so on find their
expression in and through the arbitrary convention of perspective, while seeming to remain,
again, outside of material existence, outside of production. The “eye-subject” is therefore this
“hallucinatory,” virtual space through which such transcendence is attainable and attained.
Extending this eye-subject to cinema, Baudry wonders whether one could argue that the
film camera, with its inherent mobility and interaction with multiple images, which depict
multiple and perhaps even discontinuous angles, is not only different from the eye-subject of still
painting but could potentially even “nullify” that subject (Baudry 42). For Baudry this is not so,
however, precisely because the differences between the cinematic images, which in projection
are combined to create the illusion of continuity of time and movement, are effaced in order to
produce meaning. A structuring principle, invisible and latent like the subject of perspective, is
still required for the effective operation of the cinema; an “ideal vision” remains the aim of
representation.
This leads Baudry to conclude that the cinema “lives on the denial of difference:” cinema
paradoxically requires a succession of disparate images and simultaneously requires that the
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difference between those images be eradicated in projection (Baudry 42). What specifically,
however, besides “cinema” in general, requires this denial? For difference can of course arise; as
Baudry notes, the sudden interruption of a narrative film, “when the spectator is brought abruptly
back to discontinuity,” is experienced as a disturbance to the cinema-effect (42). The
“unexpected surging forth of a marked difference” is thus possible but remains denied (42). Why
is this? The answer is found in a complicated argument in which Baudry foregrounds the nonidealist materiality of film technology (that is, disparate images) while stressing the production
of (Baudry would perhaps say usage by) the idealist dispositif (continuity, meaning, eye-subject).
Baudry asks,
Couldn’t we thus say that cinema reconstructs and forms the mechanical model (with the
simplifications that this can entail) of a system of writing constituted by a material base
and counter-system (ideology, idealism) which uses this system while also concealing it?
On the one hand, the optical apparatus and the film permit the marking of difference…on
the other hand, the mechanical apparatus both selects the minimal difference and
represses it in projection, so that meaning can be constituted: it is at once direction,
continuity, movement. (42-43)
Keeping in mind the implicit importance of technological materiality in Baudry’s work, one may
gloss this section as such: While the cinema makes possible representational practices which are
not subordinate to the ideology of the eye-subject, its material base can also, and, for the most
part, does, constitute an apparatus through which the eye-subject necessarily intervenes and
masks the possibility of its counter. The individual objectivity of the disparate film image can
arise as marked difference, in disturbance of the ideology of continuity, but the very way in
which the apparatus functions subsumes that possibility in the maintenance of the idealistic
subject.
The “transcendental subject” is therefore the next logical step in the trajectory of
perspectivist art and is made possible by the cinema. Baudry understands the “liberation” of the
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eye-subject “in the sense that a chemical reaction liberates a substance” (Baudry 43). We may
assume that this “liberation” implies some type of latent, possible state of being that, when given
the correct condition (or “chemical reaction”), transforms the prior being into that-which-itcould-be.6 While this is an idealism similar to Bazin’s myth of total cinema,7 Baudry is being
ironic here, playing at the idea of a teleology of representation8 which the cinema both expresses
and finalizes, a view he will later expand in “The Apparatus.” The aim of this irony is to
dispense with the implied innocence of phenomenology’s descriptive tendencies and its desire to
understand both the potentialities inherent to the life-world and the access of consciousness to
them. In short, Baudry wishes to illustrate how phenomenology aids the construction of an
ideological structure and process.9
THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT AND PHENOMENOLOGY
The transcendental subject must therefore be understood in terms of the phenomenology
from which it constructs itself. The camera is most important in considering this subject, as
Baudry states plainly that “the movability of the camera seems to fulfill the most favorable
conditions for the manifestation of the ‘transcendental subject’” (Baudry 43). He argues that “the
invisible base of artificial perspective,” or that virtual space which guarantees the transcendence
of meaning in perspective painting (that is, the eye-subject), is through the camera “absorbed in,
‘elevated’ to a vaster function, proportional to the movement which it can perform” (43). That is,
the movement of the camera as embodiment of the eye-subject imbues the camera with more
sophisticated properties than the typical subject of perspective art. By movement, Baudry of
course means that the camera can literally be moved from the place of inscription to the place of
projection, but this implies for him a consequent second meaning: the conventions of the eye-
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subject and the dispositif remain consistent throughout. The transcendental subject is thus a
mobile instantiation of transcendental consciousness.
Transcendental Consciousness and Phenomenology
The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy defines “transcendental” as “the form of
knowledge that is concerned not with objects themselves, but with the modes in which we are
able to know these objects, namely, with the conditions of possible experience” (695).
“Transcendental” therefore refers to a set of pre-experiential conditions upon and through which
empirical experience may be constituted. These conditions are known generally as a priori, or
conditions prior-to. Greatly simplified, then, we may say that “a system of a priori concepts
might be called transcendental philosophy” (695).
The problems surrounding this term arise from its extension to matters of consciousness,
“transcendental consciousness” being the common term around which such conflict circulates.
Transcendental philosophy holds that consciousness, in addition to being a set of a priori
conditions necessary for subjective experience, is also constitutive of the field in which it
operates and from which it departs. For this tradition, transcendental consciousness is
categorical; consciousness contains a number of categories which form our interaction with and
understanding of the objects in the world. Anything outside of this experience is transcendent (as
opposed to transcendental) and cannot be fully known. Thus is produced the idea of the Kantian
“thing-in-itself:” because transcendental consciousness is constitutive of the objects it finds, that
is, because we only know objects according to categorical consciousness, we can never really
know what things are themselves. We only have access to categorical representation. Therefore,
the first definition of transcendental, that of simple condition, also implies for Critical
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philosophy that the possibilities of transcendental consciousness are also constitutive of
empirical experience, as opposed to self-effacing in its interaction with the world.
Phenomenology, which is a post-Kantian philosophy (and therefore not a mere rejection
or supersession), was intended, among other things, as a critical elaboration of the “thing-initself.” In transcendental phenomenology (that of its founder, Edmund Husserl), the ultimate
endeavor is to arrive at an irrefutable understanding of “the things themselves.” Husserl argues
that the world, and the objects that dwell within it, exist independently of any intuiting
subjectivity and should be approached as such (Husserl 61). Objects are out-there, in-the-world,
and consequently do not require a constituting (transcendental) consciousness for either their
existence or intuition. However, phenomenology also maintains that subjectivity possesses its
own manner of intuiting, and intending (or grasping) the world; while objects retain independent
existence, subjectivity, according to the phenomenologist, still effects their common, everyday
perception. The difference between the approaches is that whereas the thing-in-itself is an
elaboration of the categorical, phenomenology resolutely stands with “the World.” Therefore, it
may generally be stated that transcendental phenomenology is a simultaneous study of the
involvement of subjectivity in the constitution of the object and attempt to grasp the object in its
truest, non-subjective form.
Sartre: Against the Transcendental Ego
Jean-Paul Sartre’s first sustained intervention in phenomenology, The Transcendence of
the Ego (TOE), is an attempt to reduce the role of the transcendental in the experience of
consciousness. For Sartre, consciousness is defined by its very activity and translucent
relationship with the world, rather than the categorical: “consciousness is no longer a set of
logical conditions. It is a fact which is absolute” (Sartre 35). The primary object of criticism in
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this endeavor is the transcendental ego. Sartre argues that while Husserl and phenomenology had
originally eradicated the need for a primordial transcendental ego, to which our experiences
belong and which is necessary for their construction, Husserl eventually reverted to using the
transcendental ego as an explanatory device. Sartre agrees that consciousness plays a part in the
constitution of the subjective world: “For our part, we readily acknowledge the existence of a
constituting consciousness” (36). He stops there, however, arguing that it does not follow that a
transcendental ego operates within that constitution: “But we raise the following question: is not
the psychic and psycho-physical me enough? Need one double it with a transcendental I, a
structure of absolute consciousness” (36). With the transcendental ego as his focus of critique,
Sartre attempts to illustrate not only that the I is not encountered in experience, but that it would
in fact necessarily pose a limitation to consciousness.
Sartre considers that “the existence of the transcendental I may be justified by the need
that consciousness has for unity and individuality. It is because all my perceptions and all my
thoughts refer themselves back to this permanent seat that my consciousness is unified” (Sartre
37). Consciousness would thus be an emanation from a personal, ordering center, a center
“whose rays (Ichstrahlen) would light upon each phenomenon presenting itself in the field of
intention” (37). However, Sartre argues that the nature of consciousness is impersonal, perhaps
even pre-personal; the interiority of consciousness is not personal because of any separate
property but simply is: “the individuality of consciousness evidently stems from the nature of
consciousness” (36-37, 39). Rather than an I producing the inward unity of consciousness,
consciousness is unified by transcending itself in its intention of objects: “the object is
transcendent to the consciousnesses which grasp it, and it is in the object that the unity of
consciousness is found” (38).10 Therefore, “the I can evidently be only an expression (rather than
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a condition) of this…inwardness of consciousness” (39-40). Sartre’s definitive judgment on the
relationship between consciousness and the transcendental I is thus an inversion of the very
formula of causality he critiques: “It is consciousness, on the contrary, which makes possible the
unity and the personality of my I. The transcendental I, therefore, has no raison d’être” (40).
One of the reasons Sartre defines as inherent to consciousness all those attributes once
credited to the transcendental ego is what David Detmer describes as Sartre’s strict application to
consciousness of the phenomenological reduction, or the process through which one suspends
one’s “natural attitude” towards the world and confronts an object as directly as possible. “If we
investigate the phenomena with sufficient care and patience, [Sartre] suggests, we will find that
they are usually adequate to meet our explanatory needs, leaving us with no legitimate reason for
extravagant extra-experiential posits” (Detmer 18). Sartre is not satisfied with hitherto theories of
consciousness, and believes that it is by reducing explanations and concepts to those intrinsic to
consciousness itself that we may best understand consciousness as in-the-world.
The important point here is that the positing of prior structures of consciousness not only
limits philosophical knowledge of consciousness, but consciousness itself. As Sartre starkly puts
it: “The transcendental I is the death of consciousness” (Sartre 40). What this dramatic
proclamation means is that if one posits the I as an absolute structure of consciousness, “if one
introduces this opacity into consciousness,” the active, creative, and free nature of consciousness
is destroyed:
[…] one congeals consciousness, one darkens it. Consciousness is then no longer a
spontaneity; it bears within itself the germ of opaqueness…consciousness has lost that
character which rendered it the absolute existent by virtue of non-existence. It is heavy
and ponderable. All the results of phenomenology begin to crumble if the I is not, by the
same title as the world, a relative existent: that is to say, an object for consciousness. (4042)
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What Sartre means by the “non-existence” of consciousness is that consciousness is action, as
opposed to an emanation from an I. “It remains therefore a ‘phenomenon’ in the very special
sense in which ‘to be’ and ‘to appear’ are one” (42). Sartre therefore privileges a consciousness
that is active, engaged in the world, and pre-personal.
The similarity between Sartre and Baudry thus begins to take shape in the form of the
threat of loss with a resultant negative gain: for Sartre, if the notion of a transcendental ego as
prior to and constituting of experience is maintained, the spontaneity and freedom of
consciousness is lost and experience becomes thoroughly personal; for Baudry, if the relations
between the technological components of the cinema are suppressed, knowledge cannot be
constituted and an ideological structure of representation is imposed and maintained. In both
cases, the transcendental, whether as “ego” or “subject,” is that which is responsible for the loss
of either spontaneity or knowledge and the gain of erroneously personal experience and
ideological value.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT AS THE MATERIAL EMBODIMENT OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL I
The transcendental subject is therefore a mobile transcendental consciousness, operating
according to the laws of the transcendental I as portrayed by Sartre. It is a central location from
which consciousness departs and to which consciousness returns. Baudry writes, “if the eye
which moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws of matter and time, if there are no more
assignable limits to its displacement…the world will not only be constituted by this eye but for
it” (Baudry 43). The camera as transcendental subject thus operates through two precise
functions: (a) the camera constitutes the world as a cinematic object according to the coordinates
of the eye-subject as objectified in the mechanical base, and (b) the apparatus returns that world
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as for the subject, that is, as an image outside of the material objectivity of the cinematic image
itself. Like the transcendental ego, the “experience” of the camera as transcendental subject is
one in which all its representations belong to it as a constituting, personal consciousness.
Whether in shooting or projection, the “world” refers back to the eye-subject and the ideological
dispositif it maintains. The material objectivity of the cinematic images, those images that exist
prior to the effacement of their differences, are constituted by the ideology of the eye-subject in
the interest of maintaining that subject’s legitimacy as an ordering principle of the world.
Representation becomes, in Sartrean terms, “thoroughly personal.”
Intentionality
Baudry justifies this point by invoking the phenomenological concept of intentionality,
which means simply that consciousness must always be consciousness of something (Baudry 43).
For Baudry, in the cinema this of something must be meaning: “For [the cinematic image] to be
an image of something, it has to constitute this something as meaning” (43). This emphasis on
meaning and its relation to the transcendental subject is crucial to understanding Baudry’s use of
phenomenology as an explanatory device for his theory. Allan Casebier, writing from a
Husserlian perspective, states that, in the preceding quote, “[Baudry] must be contending that the
image has the power to constitute a property of an object or give meaning to an object while at
the same time being constituted itself by the operation of the cinematic apparatus…the image
thereby has extraordinary powers” (Casebier 75). His refutation rests on the fact that “Husserl
wants intentionality to work just the other way around;” that is, Husserl intends for
“representation to guide our perception to its independently existing object” (75). This criticism
is incorrect, however, for Baudry does not contend that the cinematic image inherently, or non-
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arbitrarily, “has the power” to change an object or its meaning, but that the transcendental
subject does not allow the cinematic image to operate in any other way.
Unreflected, Reflecting, and Reflected Consciousness
How then does the transcendental subject allow the cinematic image to operate? For the
answer we must again turn to Sartre. Against the transcendental ego, Sartre introduces and
theorizes his privileged consciousness, “consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected
consciousness” (Sartre 41). Unreflected consciousness is first of all self-aware: “the existence of
consciousness is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of itself” (40). This
reflexivity is not the consequence of a transcendental I, but rather the very activity of
consciousness: “consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent
object…this is the law of its existence” (41). Unreflected consciousness is not itself an object, as
“the object is transcendent to the consciousnesses which grasp it, and it is in the object that the
unity of consciousness is found” (38). Sartre therefore draws a duality between consciousness
and the world of objects, in which consciousness is translucent and self-aware and the object is
opaque and “ponderable.” Furthermore, while consciousness is aware of itself as-consciousness
and through acts of consciousness, this self-consciousness is not positional—consciousness
never posits itself as an object, for “its object is by nature outside of it” (42). A specific act of
consciousness cannot leave itself in order to know itself, for its nature is to find its unity through
those objects outside of itself.
However, while unreflected consciousness never posits itself as an object, it can take as
its object another previous act of consciousness. Sartre demonstrates this hierarchy of
consciousnesses through his close reading of the Cogitio and the Kantian “I think.” He begins
with an admission: “It is undeniable that the Cogito is personal. In the I think there is an I who
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thinks” (Sartre 43). Does it then follow that the I is present in all acts of consciousness? After all,
“the I think is a condition of possibility” precisely because one is always able to perform a
reflective act of consciousness in which an object is recollected “in the personal mode,” or with
regards to a stabilizing I (43-44). However, Sartre points out that those philosophers who have
written on the Cogito “have dealt with it as a reflective operation, that is to say, as an operation
of the second degree” (44). In other words, they have always ascertained the certainty of
consciousness and its experiences through recourse to a secondary act of consciousness.
This “secondary act” is itself another level of consciousness: reflecting consciousness.
“Such a Cogito,” Sartre continues, “is performed by a consciousness directed upon
consciousness, a consciousness which takes consciousness as an object” (Sartre 44). Reflecting
consciousness takes a consciousness as its object; itself an unreflected consciousness, reflecting
consciousness posits another consciousness as an object and turns the latter into a reflected
consciousness. Thus the I think is not the affirmation of a singular consciousness at its temporal
point of action, but rather “a synthesis of two consciousnesses, one of which is consciousness of
the other” (44). This leads to Sartre’s provocation that “the consciousness which says I Think is
precisely not the consciousness which thinks” (45).
It is through the reflecting consciousness that the I appears, since, for Sartre, unreflected
consciousness is pre-personal, and its spontaneity ensures that no I is present in unreflected acts.
To illustrate his point, Sartre uses the example of remembering “the circumstances of my
reading” (Sartre 46). In order to recount the particular conscious act of reading, one must
attempt to remember the act on the terms of the unreflected consciousness of the book, its words,
and the conditions of their reading, “since the objects could have only been perceived by that
consciousness and since they remain relative to it” (46). It is not a question of “James Driscoll
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read these words,” but rather “there were words, there was reading, etc.” Other actions too
involve no I: “When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in
contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-beovertaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of consciousness” (49). Once viewed from the
standpoint of a condensed personality, the actual reading, the actual chasing of the streetcar, as
they existed as acts of consciousness, disappear. The crucial thing to remember, however, is that
reflecting consciousness, since it is itself unreflected, retains the properties of “consciousness in
the first degree:” spontaneity, non-opaqueness, translucency, and so on. Thus the posited,
reflected consciousness of my reading, when taken by the reflecting consciousness, is
structurally given as objective and certain.
The levels of consciousness can thus be summarized:
Unreflected consciousness: Consciousness of the first degree; primordial. Unreflected
consciousness is non-positional; while self-aware, it does not take itself for an object. Transcends
itself to objects and finds its unity in them. Spontaneous.
Reflecting Consciousness: An unreflected consciousness which takes as its object a prior
consciousness. The prior consciousness taken as an object was itself unreflected and becomes
reflected through the reflective consciousness.
Reflected Consciousness: An object for-consciousness. A reflected consciousness is a
formerly unreflected consciousness which is taken as an object by a reflective consciousness.
And, to reiterate their basic interactions as concerns our purposes:
A reflecting consciousness, or a consciousness which takes is its object a previous
unreflected consciousness, creates therefore a reflected consciousness, or a consciousness that is
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thus objectified and made opaque. This objectification is responsible for the appearance of states,
qualities, emotions, and so on.
This play between a translucent spontaneity and a static, posited objectivity is clearly
operative in the transcendental subject. Applying these levels of consciousness to the apparatus,
we see that the transcendental subject operates as a controlled reflecting consciousness. It depicts
cinematic images that have already been pondered, considered, objectified, and then gives itself
as intuiting them in the spontaneous, unreflected mode. Put in Baudry’s vocabulary, the
constituted image gives itself as constituting the very eye-subject through which it is ordered; in
Sartrean terms, unreflected consciousness finds its unity in objects that have already been
reflected before experience. The I, constituted by reflection, accompanies every representation.
This is what Baudry means when he says “the image seems to reflect the world but solely
in the naïve inversion of a founding hierarchy,” this hierarchy expressed for Baudry in his
quotation of Husserl: “‘The domain of natural existence thus has only an authority of the second
order, and always presupposes the domain of the transcendental’” (Baudry 43). While Casebier
argues that Husserl intends this passage to separate a consciousness “adopting the natural
standpoint” from the act of consciousness, Baudry’s usage and interpretation of the quote are
consistent with his own argument (Casebier 76). What Baudry means is this: the cinematic image
presupposes the domain of “natural existence”—social, ideological life—as itself transcendental,
as constitutive of that which imparts meaning in the cinema. The transcendental subject is
relegated to a second order, despite the fact that it creates the conditions for any “natural”
existence to be represented. Consequently the image is never allowed its own existence: the
image must be of something before it is something, it must be reflected before it can be
experienced in the unreflected mode—this is the naïveté of the apparatus image. It must refer to a
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world outside of itself in order to be an image, in order to cohere as meaning; the ideological
world always comes first.
Baudry argues further that by constituting the transcendental subject as a reflecting
consciousness, the cinematic world is not one of unreflected spontaneity but one loaded with
meaning to be elucidated by the ideal vision of the frame:
The world is no longer only an “open and unbounded horizon.” Limited by the framing,
lined up, put at the proper distance, the world offers up an object endowed with meaning,
an intentional object, implied by and implying the action of “the subject” which sights it.
At the same time that the world’s transfer as image seems to accomplish this
phenomenological reduction, this putting into parentheses of its real existence (a
suspension necessary, we will see, to formation of the impression of reality) provides a
basis for the apodicity of the ego. (Baudry 43-44)
Casebier rejects this argument, emphasizing that by framing an object in the reduction, the object
remains unchanged. This is of course a phenomenologically sound argument: “The object
remains the same throughout the reduction: When we bracket, we put aside our natural
standpoint assumptions and become aware of the manner of codetermination of the noema by
subject and object” (Casebier 76). This leads Casebier to the conclusion that “it will not do for
Baudry to try and make it look as if Husserl can justify putting aside the referent in analyzing
cinematic representation” (76). Casebier contends that Baudry is confused over the term “real” in
“this putting into parentheses of its real existence,” noting that Husserl simply means that during
reduction we set aside our natural attitude towards the object and become aware of the role
played by both subject and object in its psychic construction. For Casebier, it is unacceptable to
argue that the “reality” of the world is altered by its framing in the cinema.
Keeping in mind that Baudry is not merely using phenomenology but challenging its
apparent innocence, it must be insisted that Baudry references Husserl to arrive at an
understanding of the ideological subjectivity of the eye-subject in its cinematic manifestation. He
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is creating a conceptual subjectivity that he believes plays a structural role in the cinema; he is
not attempting to contribute to the Husserlian philosophy of representation. This subjectivity is
one in which the natural standpoint, or the associative world of ideology, is given is as
transcendental, as an effect of the erosion of the differences between individual images and the
restored continuity of movement and narrative:
The search for such narrative continuity…can only be explained by an essential
ideological stake projected in this point: it is a question of preserving at any cost the
synthetic unity of the locus where meaning originates [the subject]—the constituting
transcendental function to which narrative continuity points back as its natural secretion.
(Baudry 44)
“Synthetic” possesses two meanings here: first, that of the artificial, the arbitrary, the created,
and second, the synthesis of various elements. The “ideological stake” to which Baudry refers,
then, is the preservation of a structural subjectivity, “the subject,” which gives itself as both prior
to and constituted by the meaning it produces. Specific ideological meanings that are pinned to
cinematic images arise from the demand of the apparatus that those images refer to the world
ordered by the eye-subject and the arbitrary ordering principle it exercises on the nonrepresentational world. The subject-as-camera shows a world which it constructs in its very
operation but which is purported as merely the world’s reflection. While Casebier’s argument
that “the objects represented by art exist independently of the intentional act of apprehending
them” may be true according to his realist obligations, this argument ignores both the way in
which those objects are relationally presented and the materiality of filmic images (Casebier 75).
Concerning narrative cinema, the question is not whether the object depicted in the cinematic
representation is changed by the image, an argument Casebier attributes to Baudry, but rather
whether or not the cinematic image is an object in its own right.
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Two Identifications
After providing a comparison between the film screen and the mirror, Baudry writes that
“the ‘reality’ mimed by the cinema is thus first of all that of a ‘self.’ But, because the reflected
image is not that of the body itself but that of a world already given as meaning, one can
distinguish two levels of identification” (Baudry 45). The first level is that of the content of the
narrative film, “the character portrayed as center of secondary identifications, carrying an
identity which constantly must be seized and reestablished” (45).11 The second level, which
“permits the appearance of the first and places it ‘in action’...is the transcendental subject whose
place is taken by the camera which constitutes and rules the objects in this ‘world’” (45). This
leads Baudry to the conclusion that
the spectator identifies less with what is represented, the spectacle itself, than with what
stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging him to see what it sees...just as the mirror
assembles the fragmented body in a sort of imaginary integration of the self, the
transcendental self unites the discontinuous fragments of phenomena, of lived experience,
into unifying meaning. (46)
Let us first examine the notion that the cinema “mimes” a reality that is “first of all as
that of a self.” Because Baudry utilizes Lacan’s mirror phase in this final section of the text, this
notion of a “self” is problematic in that phenomenological and psychoanalytic selves are
juxtaposed without a clear purpose. What is this self? Joan Copjec points out that in apparatus
theory there is a certain ambiguity to the notion of the screen projecting a “self:” “it can refer
either to an image of the subject or an image belonging to a subject” (Copjec, RD 21). Copjec
then notes that “both references are intended by film theory” and, reiterating a common
indictment of apparatus theory, argues that it matters not “whether that which is represented is
specularized as an image of the subject's own body or as the subject's image of someone or
something else;” it is overall a question of mastery and satisfaction: “it is this aspect that allows
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the subject to see in any representation not only a reflection of itself but a reflection of itself as
master of all it surveys;” “the subject is satisfied that it has been adequately reflected on the
screen” (21-22).
Copjec’s Lacanian obligations commit her to the idea of the split subject; her reference
to, and critique of the “masterful self” is rooted in Lacan’s split between the eye and the gaze, a
split which deprives the subject of visual mastery over desire. Her issue with apparatus theory
therefore is that the apparatus always succeeds; despite the fact that the spectator, the subject, is
split, ideological cohesion tautologically reproduces itself by simply representing the theoretical
apparatus-spectator with a cohesive vision of a “self” with which to identify. This is at odds with
the Lacanian necessity that subject is in fact the very site of failure in all registers, whether they
be of language or imaginary identification. This objection finds agreement in the practice of
Structuralist/Materialist film, in which the failure of meaning is advocated and sought after, and
we will expand up that practice below. However, we must reiterate that we are departing here
from Sartre, not Lacan; the apparatus is not a concept at odds with the split subject, but rather a
structural reproduction aimed at limiting the authentic, spontaneous, and creative consciousness
of the phenomenological subject. Immersion is real despite the existence of the psychoanalytic
subject. If filmic sense founds the subject apparatus, as Copjec argues, it is filmic sense that does
not have to be this way but is.
First Level of Identification: the I
The first level of identification, that of characters, situations, ideas, meaning, is, in
Sartrean terms, that of the transcendental ego. It is the I, constituted by the reflecting acts of the
transcendental subject, to which cinematic representations adhere. Sartre notes that “the ego is
the unity of states and actions...it is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, like the object-pole of
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unreflected attitude, except that this pole appears solely in the world of reflection” (Sartre 61,
emphasis mine). While I do not intend a play on the word “reflection,” which is a key term for
Baudry’s conception of “the screen mirror,” I do intend to show that what plays out on the screen
in Baudry’s apparatus is entirely on the realm of reflection in the Sartrean sense. Just as Baudry
emphasizes the synthetic nature of representation as created by the transcendental subject, where
disparate images are cohered to create meaning outside themselves as-images, so does Sartre
emphasize the ego as a synthetic unity of disparate consciousnesses in relation to transcendent
objects outside themselves as-consciousnesses.
One of these objects is the state, or a static entity that seemingly colors psychic
experience from the pre-experiential location of the transcendental ego. States are apprehended
through a reflecting consciousness—an unreflected consciousness which takes as its object
another unreflected consciousness—and are themselves transcendent objects (Sartre 61).12 The
example Sartre uses to explain the state is hatred. Sartre imagines that he feels a “profound
convulsion of repugnance and anger” when faced with another person (62). “The convulsion is
consciousness,” Sartre maintains; “I cannot be mistaken when I say: I feel at this moment a
violent repugnance for Peter” (62). However, for Sartre, this experience itself is not hatred, for
this hatred of Peter has existed before this spontaneous experience and, so Sartre thinks, will
exist in the future: “An instantaneous consciousness of repugnance could not, then, be my
hatred” (62). In fact, Sartre goes so far as to say that if restricted to the absolute instantaneity of
the feeling, he would only be allowed to say “I feel a repugnance for Peter at the moment,” from
which, by virtue of setting aside either past or future encounters, it follows that “I would cease to
hate” (62).
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Hatred ceases in this manner because “hatred is a state;” as opposed to both the
consciousness experiencing the repugnance for Peter, and the reflecting consciousness which
takes that consciousness as its object, hatred is given as “affirming its permanence” (Sartre 66,
63). Whereas for Sartre consciousness is by nature both to be and to appear, hatred is pure being,
“since it gives itself as continuing to be even when I am absorbed in other occupations and no
consciousness reveals it” (63). This leads Sartre to posit that “hatred, then, is a transcendent
object” (63). States are therefore inert, passive, and transcendent objects which are not of
consciousness by rather apprehended in or through consciousness: “Hatred is credit for an
infinity of angry or repulsed consciousnesses in the past and in the future” (63). It is therefore an
error to impute to any unreflected consciousness the character of hatred.
States receive the most attention from Sartre in TOE and are of most importance to our
purposes. However, states exist in regards to their unity with actions and at times qualities, a
unity found, again, in the ego. Regarding actions, Sartre makes no distinction as to the
transcendent quality of either physical or psychical actions (Sartre 68-69). An action is the
reflected “unity of the active consciousnesses” which comprise it (69). The quality, on the other
hand, is “optional,” and “can exist [as] an intermediary between actions and states” (70). The
quality, like the state and the action, is transcendent, and “represents a substratum of the states”
(70). Qualities are a set of potentials which find expression, or “actuality,” through the state.
Whereas the state of hatred continues to exist “in the absence of any feeling of hatred,” a certain
nuance to the state of hatred, such as spite, “remains a potentiality” (71). And while “potentiality
is not mere possibility” and “presents itself as something which really exists,” it only ever exists
in full, or in “potency” (71). Sartre concludes that on the subject of qualities, “the influence of
preconceived ideas and of social factors is here preponderant” (71).

37

While the relation between these aspects of the ego, as well as the ego’s construction,
will be examined in the next chapter concerning the more-than-real, it does now to say that the
ego is the site in which the personal meaning of spontaneous acts is formed and pondered.
Keeping in mind that the transcendental subject is a reflecting consciousness, and that it is
through reflecting consciousness that we have access to states, actions, and qualities, the first
level of identification, that of representational meaning, is itself concerned with the relation
between states, actions, and qualities. It is both their inter-relations and their unified relation with
the transcendental subject that forms the site upon which ideological meaning is inscribed.
Sartre concedes that “we readily acknowledge that the relation of the hatred to the
particular Erlebnis of repugnance is not logical. It is a magical bond, assuredly. But we have
aimed only at describing” (Sartre 68). However, we will see that, in the apparatus, the illogical
relations between the state, the consciousness through which the state is glimpsed, and the
reflecting consciousness which posits the former consciousness as its object, are structural. The
first level of identification in the apparatus is thus comprised of tensions inherent to the
constitution of the Sartrean ego, in which states, actions, and qualities are all unified and given as
meaning, or what we shall later call a state-of-meaning. This is possible, “permitted,” by the
second, primordial level of identification: the conflation of unreflected, reflected, and reflecting
consciousness.
Second Level of Identification: Reflecting, Reflection, Unreflected
We begin to elaborate this constitution by returning to the following quote: “Just as the
mirror assembles the fragmented body in a sort of imaginary integration of the self, the
transcendental self unites the discontinuous fragments of phenomena, of lived experience, into
unifying meaning” (Baudry 46). While this is of course a comparison between Lacan’s mirror
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stage and the constituting action of the transcendental subject, we may apply Sartrean philosophy
to the second half of this sentence without any loss of argumentative coherence. Allow “the
discontinuous fragments of phenomena, of lived experience” to be unreflected consciousnessnes,
or consciousnesses unified by the objects which they grasp. Since unreflected consciousness is
by nature spontaneous, “lived experience” is thus the pre-personal transcendental field in which
these “discontinuous fragments” appear. As Sartre shows, states find expression through these
unreflected consciousnesses but are not these unreflected consciousnesses; they are rather the
unity of any number of unreflected consciousnesses, which only appears at the reflective level.
Thus my feeling of disgust when near Peter is a spontaneous consciousness which I cannot
doubt: it is “lived experience;” it is only when I, on the reflective level, posit the previous
consciousness as an object to be explained, that I produce the unity of the consciousness of
disgust as emanating from some being called hatred. This is the “unifying meaning” I attribute to
a consciousness that in the last instance is spontaneous and without any meaning outside of its
temporal existence.
We see, then, that the apparatus utilizes this operation of reflection and implements it: as
opposed to Sartre’s structural necessity that the I, the ego, is never actually present in unreflected
experience, the constitution of the ego of the apparatus occurs in the opposite way: in the
apparatus, the ego is always present in unreflected experience. The “unifying meaning” is always
given at the same instance as the unreflected act (reflecting consciousness is itself unreflected) of
the transcendental subject. This is why the transcendental subject confusedly appears as
constituting and constituted by the apparatus; it is both at once. The transcendental subject is a
reflecting consciousness which necessarily produces a reflected consciousness; all acts of
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consciousness are already imbued with meaning as concerns a central location of identity: its
very ideological charge is that such reflecting consciousnesses are also given as unreflected.

Definition
The secondary, anterior level of identification, then, is with a structural consciousness,
embodied by the camera, which permits such an ever-presence of the ego (pre-determined unity
of meaning) in representation. We may thus at this point define the transcendental subject as
such: the transcendental subject is the formal imposition of an unreflected and reflecting
consciousness which always constitutes an ego through its representations. The confusion
surrounding the eye-subject, that it is both constituting and constituted, is produced by the
second level of identification: the subject and object are produced simultaneously by a central
locale.
We must throughout all this keep in mind that Sartre, unlike Baudry, is not describing
what he views as a nefarious ideological process, and even concedes a possible necessity to the
ego:
Perhaps, in reality, the essential function of the ego is not so much theoretical but
practical....perhaps the essential role of the ego is to mask from consciousness its very
spontaneity. A phenomenological description of spontaneity would show, indeed, that
spontaneity renders impossible any distinction between action and passion, or any
conception of an autonomy of the will. These notions have meaning only on a level where
all activity is given as emanating from a passivity which it transcends; in short, on a level
at which man considers himself as at once subject and object. (Sartre 100-101, emphasis
mine)
Therefore the explanatory potential of spontaneous consciousnesses is only found through the
ego, or the unity produced by reflective acts which consider consciousnesses as objects. The
problem, again, is whether or not the ego is constitutive of experience: in Sartre, it is not; in the
apparatus, it is. Therefore while the ego may be “practical” for Sartre, Baudry argues that, in the
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apparatus, “everything happens as if, the subject himself being unable—and for a reason—to
account for his own situation, it was necessary to substitute secondary organs, grafted on to
replace his own defective ones, instruments or ideological formations capable of fulfilling his
role as subject” (Baudry 46). Therefore the institution of the ego as constitutive of cinematic
representation is only practical if by practical we mean ideological—it is implemented by the
technological simulation of an unreflected, reflecting consciousness, not by a reflecting
consciousness of the life-world. Sartre’s philosophical deliberation on the ego and its relation to
the experience and meaning of consciousness is actualized as ideological conflict in Baudry’s
theory of the transcendental subject.
While we here begin to approach the spectator, we shall relegate any sustained
deliberation on the matter to the next chapter. However, as we have defined the transcendental
subject in strict Sartrean terms, one final interpretation of Baudry’s words will help further
clarify the stakes. Baudry argues that “disturbing cinematic elements,” or those elements which
seem to arise from areas elsewhere than the narrative (the foregrounding of “the cinematic,” in
technological/materialist terms), produce a jarring effect: “Both specular tranquility and the
assurance of one’s own identity collapse simultaneously with the revealing of the mechanism,
that is of the inscription of the film-work” (Baudry 46).
In “The Legacy of Brechtianism” (included in Post-Theory), Murray Smith compares the
work of Baudry to Brecht (the latter being a common invocation of “post-structuralist” film
theory, especially British “Screen theory”) for a “further index of the incompatibility of Brecht
and Post-Structuralism” (Smith 146). Invoking the above argument by Baudry that when (a) the
film-work is repressed, ideological surplus value is created and (b) when the film-work is
exposed, the identity of the spectator “collapses,” Smith argues that Baudry’s conclusions are at
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odds with the Brechtian collapse of the Fourth Wall: “For Brecht, revealing this work can result
in a more critical spectator; for Baudry, the spectator’s identity ‘collapses.’ Of course, it is far
from clear what the nature of this collapse is; but it seems very distant from Brecht’s confident,
cigar-smoking, rational spectator” (147).
A reply to Murray’s charge of the “far from clear nature” of this collapsing identity
serves as a convenient transition to the more-than-real and its relation to the spectator. By
exposing the imposed reflection of the apparatus, the support of the apparatus ego, the collapses.
The “identity” that collapses is first the ego of the apparatus and, consequently and potentially,
the spectator’s ego, who is faced with himself as an unreflected consciousness in a world of
objects, or cinematic images which are simply as they are, rather than being of something in an
already meaningful sense. One of the main arguments of Structuralist/Materialist film is that
narrative cinema, in all its forms, necessarily reproduces visual relations which reify not only
ideological norms in visual culture but those held by the spectator him- or herself. The purpose
of radical filmmaking, then, is to both produce and dismantle these identities and identifications
within the temporal projection time of the film. Baudry is up to something similar here, and the
comparison is clearly lost on Smith. It is not that the apparatus and its construction can simply be
ameliorated, or elided, through exposure of the film-ness of a film; it is simply that in such
exposure, a dialectic is enacted. Through this dialectic the relation of the spectator to the
transcendental subject is not eradicated, but problematized.
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CHAPTER 2: THE MORE-THAN-REAL
One of the major difficulties of connecting Baudry’s work across his two most influential
essays, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” (“IE”) and “The
Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema” (“The
Apparatus”), is the difference in their source material and methodology. If a certain commitment
remains the same—the exposure of the ideological nature of both cinema
technology/spectatorship and the philosophical tradition from which they emanate—the aim and
content of each article nevertheless differ in key ways. “IE,” with its investigation into the
philosophical and ideological consequences of film technology, is still very much concerned
with the phenomenology of classical Bazinian film theory and criticism. Its interest in
psychoanalysis is brief, rudimentary, and, consequently, largely compatible with Sartrian duality.
Furthermore, while the essay is prescriptive in certain sections, it still maintains a somewhat
descriptive feel; the essay is rhetorically intended as the nascent, humble notes of an ongoing
study.
“The Apparatus,” on the other hand, attempts two ambitious goals. First, the essay is a
much more explicit attempt at a psychoanalytic explanation of cinematic reality and its relation
to spectatorship. Baudry applies psychoanalytic theories of dream to the experience of film
spectatorship, crafting a theory of cinematic reality that culminates in a complicated schema
involving the preconcious, conscious, and unconscious systems (Baudry 122).1 Secondly, and
perhaps more cavalier, Baudry argues for a representational teleology historically operative
throughout Platonic philosophy, the psychology of dream, and cinema. Considering Plato’s cave
allegory from an analytic perspective stressing desire and wish fulfillment,2 Baudry writes that
“we can thus propose that the allegory of the cave is the text of a signifier of desire which haunts
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the invention of cinema and the history of its invention” (112). In other words, along with a
metapsychological study of the impression of reality, Baudry wants to expose a related but
independent narrative inherent to cinema: the culmination of a certain human desire as expressed
through philosophy, dream, and technology.
THE “INHIBITION ANALOGY:” PLATO, DREAM, AND THE MORE-THAN-REAL
The Cave
The origins of this desire dwell firstly within Plato’s cave, where prisoners are chained to
a wall and given to contemplate representations produced by unseen manipulators of light and
shadow. “In Plato,” writes Baudry, “something haunts the subject; something belabours him and
determines his condition;” this “something” is representational deception: “Plato’s prisoner is the
victim of an illusion of reality, that is, precisely what is known as an hallucination, if one is
awake, as a dream, if asleep; he is the prey of an impression, of an impression of reality”
(Baudry 107). Such disparity between truth and illusion is common to Plato and the idealist
tradition; proximity, transparency, and their relation to truth are of central concern to idealism.
That the subject in Plato is haunted by an interference with the immediacy of reality is not
surprising. What is surprising to Baudry is that, in order to make his point, Plato constructs an
allegory that “quite precisely describes in its mode of operation the cinematographic apparatus
and the spectator’s place in relation to it” (107).
One of these modes of operation is the way in which the “forced immobility” of the
prisoners influences their belief in the reality of the representations. Obviously their enforced
inertia prevents them from investigating the apparatus producing the forms before them; they are
literally incapable of looking behind them, towards the light source and the operator of the
apparatus, and consequently remain unaware of the illusion to which they are prey. What is
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crucial for Baudry, however, is Plato’s argument that even if the prisoners were to learn of the
outside world and implored to free themselves of both immobility and illusion, “they would
prefer to stay where they are and to perpetuate this immobility rather than leave” (Baudry 108).
For Baudry, “the prisoner’s shackles correspond to an actual reality in the individual’s
evolution;” their desire to remain seated where they are, in relation to the illusion moving before
them, therefore represents a benchmark in the historical relationship between the subject and
representation (108). That relationship has apparently evolved into a modern cinematic
manifestation, as Baudry notes that “the spectator’s immobility is characteristic of the filmic
apparatus as a whole,” and concludes that immobility could therefore be thought of as “a
necessary if not sufficient condition” for the prisoners’ belief in the impression of reality of the
cave and, in the present, the spectator’s belief in cinematic reality (108).
A film example that nicely illustrates the relationship between forced immobility and the
impression of reality is the administration of the Ludivico technique to Alexander DeLarge
(Malcolm McDowell) in A Clockwork Orange (1971). To begin with, Alex is straight-jacketed in
his theater chair and his eyes are held open by clamps. Behind him sit Dr. Brodsky (Carl
Duering), Dr. Branom (Madge Ryan), and other various physicians; they are, like those unseen
operators of Plato’s apparatus, the guardians of representation and its potential for conditioning.
That Alex sits in a large cinema theater, and not a clearly denoted hospital operating theater, is of
note here: the didactic intent of the technique is foregrounded as directly related to the cinematic
situation in itself. Plumes of light and smoke emanate from behind the doctors, imparting a
mystical connotation to both the apparatus and the representations it produces; the success of the
Ludivico technique, the relationship between the representations and their production, remains
hidden by its very presentation as a technique—one thinks here of the Minister’s (Anthony
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Sharp) proclamation, “The point is that it works!” Finally, as the dream-like representations
unfold before Alex’s imprisoned eye (which is denoted as the eye-subject of the technique), Alex
muses with fascination that “it’s funny how the colors of the world only seem really real when
you viddy them on the screen.”
It is this last sentiment, this notion of a “really real,” that is the focus of this chapter. The
comparison between Plato and cinema is the first component of what Noël Carroll calls Baudry’s
“inhibition analogy;” the cinemagoer is, like Plato’s prisoners, inert in his or her seat, and
therefore prey to illusion. As we have seen, this analogy finds itself aptly expressed by A
Clockwork Orange, in that representation possesses the power to shape the human subject’s
relationship with reality, provided there exist sufficient conditions of bodily immobility.
However, in terms of my overall project, the first analogy can only be so relevant; since we are
concerned with questions of consciousness and the philosophical and representational definitions
of reality, the literal inhibition of the corporeal body is of considerably reduced concern.
Therefore, we shall now turn our focus to the second “inhibition analogy,” or the relation
between the dreamer and the spectator. It is my argument that Alex’s revelation that cinema
imparts reality with its real-ness, that cinema is “really real,” does not require a mystical forced
immobility for its validity.
Psychoanalysis and Dream
In The Language of Psycho-analysis, J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis define “the reality
principle” as “one of the two principles which for Freud govern mental functioning” (Laplanche
and Pontalis 379). They continue:
As a regulatory principle of mental functioning, the reality principle emerges secondarily,
modifying the pleasure principle which has been dominant up to this point; its
establishment goes hand in hand with a whole series of adaptations which the psychical
apparatus has to undergo: the development of conscious functions—attention, judgment,
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memory; the replacement of motor discharge by an action aimed an appropriate
transformation of reality; the beginnings of thought… (380).
The reality principle is thus a system of psychic organization that produces human subjects
assimilable to civilized society, which concomitantly produces the compartmentalization of
satisfaction, phantasmatic relations, the unconscious, and so on. The reality principle is then
governed by the reality test, or the “process postulated by Freud which allows the subject to
distinguish stimuli originating in the outside world from internal ones” in the interest of
preventing a subject from taking hallucinatory reality (personal, subjective, phantasmatic) as
external reality (societal, subjective relation to objectivity) (382). Dream, one could say, is the
desire to experience the hallucination foreclosed by the reality principle, in the form of mental
representation, as though that experience had actually passed the scrutiny of the reality test.
The second component of the inhibition analogy is the comparison made by Baudry
between this psychoanalytic account of dream and cinema. Following Freud, Baudry maintains
that dream is a regressive confusion of perception—that is, registered action or communication
understood as external to one’s being—and unconscious representation, for the sake of fulfilling
a certain desire: “Dream is ‘an hallucinatory psychosis of desire’—i.e. a state in which mental
perceptions are taken for perceptions of reality” (Baudry 115). The difference between these
“mental perceptions,” or dream-representations, and reality, is, again, held in place by the reality
test, which is dependent on motoricity and the perception of an action, and therefore an agency,
external to oneself (115). The elimination of motoricity in sleep therefore provides conditions for
regression, in which representational fantasies (“mental perception”) are not impeded by the
reality test and possess the charge of existential reality (“perceptions of reality” as regulated by
the reality test) (115). In dream, the “content of thought” in the waking life-world undergoes a
hallucinatory transformation into “a phantasy of desire” which is then manifested “as a sensory
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perception” (115). Such regression provides “a kind of satisfaction which we knew at the
beginning of our psychical life,” when the separation between perception and representation,
with its consequent establishment of presence and absence, had not yet been enforced (115). The
primordial desire of dream, put succinctly, is the elimination of the reality test in order to return
to a certain state of satisfaction mythologized in infancy.
Baudry connects this regressive desire and cinema by appealing to analyst Bertram D.
Lewin’s theory of the “dream screen,” which explains both why and how the representations of
dream are formally displayed within a regressive apparatus. During infancy, the child cannot
discern itself as separate from its immediate surroundings, namely its mother’s breast.
Consciousness, being, and representation have not yet been separated by external intervention.
Their enforced separation via the reality principle prompts the desire to return to this state, since
only through the absence of its unity does the infant notice its presence.3 This separation is prior
to, and more fundamental than, the misrecognition of the mirror phase; if the latter involves the
foundation of the spectral ego, the former is a primordial, requisite division (Baudry 117). The
dream wish is therefore a yearning to return to a state devoid of a differentiated consciousness,
ego, or subject.
Such a fathomed presence, however, can never be experienced in full; consequently, this
wish is sentenced to repetitive failure, enabling hallucination as a partial satisfaction (Baudry
115). The breast therefore becomes the hallucinated screen upon which dreams are projected,
since it is the cathected site of the loss of pre-principled fullness.4 Resultantly, dream offers the
subject a regressive state characterized by a “lack of distinction between representation and
perception…which makes for our belief in the reality of the dream” (117). Divisions inherent to
waking subjectivity vanish, and the dream, with its confused distinctions, produces a “specific
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reality that reality does not impart, but which is provoked by hallucination: a more-than-real that
dream precisely considered as an apparatus and as repetition of a particular state…would be able
to bring ” (118). Therefore, the more-than-real in dream is a representational density in which the
difference between waking perception (the life-world) and unconscious representation dissolves,
affording representation the felt status of an external, temporally irreversible reality without the
impediment of a differentiated subject.5
The Cinema as Dream
The impression of reality of cinema also involves a series of seemingly unmediated (the
“screen” of the dream or the cinema is effaced, repressed, in the dream-work or cinema-work)
representations taken for perceptions in a seamless relay. As Baudry puts it, “there is no doubt
that in dealing with images, and the unfolding of images, the rhythm of vision and movement,
are imposed on him in the same way as images in dream and hallucination” (Baudry 120). Just as
dream requires certain conditions for its own impression of reality, such as lack of motoricity, a
self-effacing screen, and a desire for a certain (non)subjectivity, so too does cinema replicate
such conditions. For Baudry, “the darkness of the movie theater, the relative passivity of the
situation, the forced immobility of the cine-subject” all work to foster precisely the kind of
simulation chamber needed to “bring about a state of artificial regression” (119). Emphasizing
“the partial elimination of the reality test,” Baudry insists that the cinema spectator, like Freud
and Lacan’s dreamer, is one who is shown, one lacking the ability for intervention: “no more
than in dream does he have means to act in any way upon the object of his perception, change his
viewpoint as he would like” (120).
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Carroll’s Objections
Carroll objects to the “inhibition analogy” on pragmatic grounds: Baudry’s spectator
could, at any moment, get up and leave the theater for a cigarette; he or she could stand up in the
back row and pace, perhaps due to the suspense of the narrative or a cramp caused by sitting;
conversation between two spectators as to the repugnancy of a certain character is not only
possible but common; and all this occurs without any loss of narrative immersion (Carroll, MM
22-23). The representations of cinema are seen by conscious, wakeful subjects capable of
spontaneous movement. As Carroll rightly points out, “a key reason [for Baudry to compare
spectatorship to infancy and dream] is that in those cases the lack of mobility, for different
reasons, is involuntary. However, no matter how sedentary our film viewing is, we are not
involuntary prisoners in our seats” (22). The spectator is neither a sleeper trapped within a REM
cycle nor an infant acclimating to the reality principle while feeding. After conceding that the
inhibition analogy is intended as metaphorical, Carroll asks “why should a correlation between
[Baudry’s] metaphorical description of the film viewer and the literal motor inhibition of the
sleeper count as anything more than an entertaining but fanciful piece of equivocation” (23-24).
In other words, why should an article based on an easily repudiated analogy be a point of
departure for a theory of cinematic reality?
Such criticism isolates a stake of this antagonism between Baudry and Carroll: does the
very viewing of film retain any sort of structurally altered relation with non-cinematic reality
regardless of the refutation of Baudry’s analogies and metaphors? Attempting a logical negation,
Carroll argues that “Baudry connects the putative impression of reality imparted by film to
inhibited motoricity. Given this, one would predict that that impression would not occur if the
spectator watched while also moving voluntarily” (Carroll, MM 23). This argument is sound;
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given the emphasis Baudry places on motoricity and its absence as the corporeal facilitation of
dream, the truth of the spectator’s viewing situation (he or she literally can move, literally is
reflexively aware) could ostensibly negate his theory of the more-than-real. However, from a
psychoanalytic perspective, reality-testing can still be eliminated in the life-world. According to
Laplance and Pontalis,
Once a hallucinatory state or dream-state holds sway there is no ‘test’ that can counter it.
So even in cases where reality-testing should theoretically be equipped to play a
discriminatory role it is apparently ineffectual in practice from the start (hence the
uselessness of recourse to motor action by the hallucinating subject as a way of
distinguishing between subjective and objective). (Laplance and Pontalis 384, emphasis
mine)
Therefore the literal ability of the spectator to move does not negate Baudry’s comparison
between dream and cinema; the phantasmatic blurring between subject and object may continue
to subsist in movement. If one takes (and one easily could) Baudry’s “artificial regression” as the
imposing “sway” of hallucination, Carroll’s argument, in its seeming obviousness, becomes
simply narrow. What Laplanche’s and Pontalis’ remarks help make clear is that this blurring
between subjective and objective, as produced specifically by the apparatus, satisfies the desire
that “consists in obtaining from reality a position, a condition in which what is perceived would
no longer distinguished from representations” (Baudry 121).
RETURN TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
Reality Testing
It is the question of such a position, a position from which can be achieved and in which
can be experienced the more-than-real, that returns us to the transcendental subject. Baudry
states plainly that “the impression of reality is dependent first of all on a subject-effect,” and that
“in order to explain the cinema-effect,” one must consider what sort of subject both requires and
is required by the apparatus (Baudry 119). This is my precise point of departure concerning the
51

impression of reality and the more-than-real: I do not believe that the more-than-real is required,
for its continued theorization, to constantly answer to the question of “actual spectators,” as
though it were an innocently impenetrable objection to both the “inhibition analogy” and the
work built upon that analogy. Carroll’s a fortiori reasoning is not the end of apparatus theory.
The continual work on the theory of the apparatus, both in terms of subject and reality-effect, is
not a denial of the existence of human spectators at the behest of analogy, but an attempt to
understand the structural continuities inherent to a specific theory of cinematic experience.
Those continuities exist in the relations between the transcendental subject, with its
unreflected and reflected levels of consciousness, and the more-than-real, with its conceptual
separation between perception and representation. The reality test, whether non-operative in
dream or partially operative in cinema is, for our purposes, a matter of the controlled interaction
between different levels of consciousness and representation. Carroll notes that while “Baudry
also connects lack of reality testing with the inhibition of movement,” what Baudry really refers
to is not literal reality testing but the notion that “the viewer lacks the ability to test reality within
the world of the film” (Carroll, MM 24). What Carroll seems to mean by this is that Baudry
makes a judgment on the inability of the viewer to interact with the pro-filmic, or the world as it
exists prior to its filmic inscription. Because the viewing subject cannot perceive the external
reality of the pro-filmic, the more-than-real intervenes, preventing some type of true
engagement. Carroll points to specific instances in which in fact “there are…means to test the
veracity of our experience of films,” concluding that “it seems to me inappropriate to describe
the film viewer as lacking the means for testing reality” (25).
Carroll’s literalism fails to account for the complexity of cinematic reality testing, a
complexity that in fact has been noted by post-structuralist theory and criticism. Pascal Bonitzer,
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a prominent critic and theorist during Cahiers du Cinéma’s most political and theoretical period
(and who thus, while a critic of Baudry’s work, nevertheless exists within the same theoretical
trajectory), explains the way in which film spectatorship involves a dialectic of avowal and
disavowal of both the reality of the pro-filmic and its resultant representation. Bonitzer states that
“we never succumb absolutely, hypnotically, to the ‘reality’ of cinema,” and discusses how film
spectatorship involves a reflexive awareness and forgetting of the filmic-ness of the film, which
produces bouts of belief and disbelief in the truth and falsity of the cinematic image (Bonitzer
291-293). Even in the critical, theoretical viewing of cinema is involved an awareness of its
cinema-ness as well as an acceding to the very “fictive depth” involved in viewing: “the critical
viewing of cinema emerges as a dissociation from the filmic object; it analyzes while continuing
to ‘live’ the fiction—a cleavage of the subject. Thus we often find ourselves trying to work out
how a trick effect was achieved while at the same time being taken in by it” (291).
“Automatic Ideological Action,” Back to Sartre
All this is to say that whereas Carroll in his objections focuses on the content of the film,
or the pro-filmic and its representation, Baudry and apparatus theory are concerned with the form
or structure through which any such content may be intended. It is not that the pro-filmic is
foreclosed by the film-work, but that the apparatus is the suspension of reality within reality. As
Baudry asks, “And is it not rather the apparatus, the cinematographic process itself than the
content of images—that is, the film—which is under scrutiny here” (Baudry 106, my emphasis).
Again, what apparatus theory is most fundamentally concerned with is consciousness. It is the
theorization of a formal process of interaction between both a subject and its replication. The
following remark by Bonitzer helps further orient things:
The automatic ideological action which inaugurates our viewing of a film, our experience
of the projection, is to invest the surface of the screen with a fictive depth. This depth
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denotes the reality within the fiction, the reality of the fiction. This ideological
engagement is more imperative in the cinema than in any other signifying operation. It is
what we call “the impression of reality.” (Bonitzer 291)
It is this “automatic ideological action,” or the structural “ideological engagement” of the
transcendental subject with cinematic reality—or more specifically, the more-than-real—that is
at stake here. To speak of an “automatic ideological action which inaugurates our viewing of a
film” is to speak of a process that requires both a subject and an object working in tandem. If the
impression of reality is “automatic,” if the impression of reality is, as Baudry says, dependent on
a subject-effect, then the impression of reality must be theorized in terms of a subject that both
requires and is required by that impression.
THE MORE-THAN-REAL
What follows is a structural schema that explains the production of the more-than-real as
it occurs through the action of the transcendental subject. It is my aim to illustrate that the
simultaneous interaction between the levels of consciousness comprising the Sartrian subject—
unreflected, reflecting, and reflected consciousness—is a complement to Baudry’s interactive
conflation of perceptions and representations in dream and cinema. It is by conflating these
levels of consciousness that the apparatus is able to produce an impression of reality that reality
itself does not impart. An introductory summary of this schema looks like this: on the unreflected
level of the transcendental subject, the impression of reality gives itself as an irreversible
representation of the unreflected “world of objects.” On the reflective level, these representations
find themselves immediately emanating from a static, stable ideological base that immediately
imparts those representations, spontaneous as they are, with ideological/epistemological value.
This ideological base is the Satrian ego, or the “opaque object” which is wrongly credited for the
imparting of states onto the objects intended at the unreflected level. The Sartrian ego is, in a
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sense, behind the cinema screen. Finally, it is the unreflected consciousness of the spectator, in
front of the screen, that completes the “automatic ideological action” of the more-than-real.
The Constitution of the Ego
Returning to the “partial elimination of the reality test,” let us recall Baudry’s comment
that “the subject has always the choice to close his eyes, to withdraw from the spectacle, but no
more than in dream does he have means to act in any way upon the object of his perception,
change his viewpoint as he would like” (Baudry 120). Since we are dealing with an impression
of reality, it is crucial to insist that this partial elimination produces a semblance, a seeming
inability to act on the representations. Again, Carroll concedes metaphor in Baudry’s
descriptions; his objections are not completely borne of literalism. His issue, rather, is whether or
not Baudry adequately describes a structure that definitively produces this prohibitive semblance.
From the perspective of Sartrean terminology, Baudry’s assertion is sound: that the spectator
cannot effect the object that is the film is to denote the film as an opaque in-itself, to which the
spectator can only transcend to and intend on its own objective terms. The film and its
ideological constitution remain unchanged. The drama of Baudry’s argument, then, is that the
“unfolding of images,” and their ideological connotations, appear as irreversible and inevitable
(120). Apparatus cinema requires a subject that (a) intuits cinematic reality as a stream of
spontaneous objects in a way similar to the life-world but (b) cannot change that which it
experiences as a representational object imbued with sedimented meaning. While this obviously
calls to mind the distinction between perception and representation inherent to the reality test,
Baudry also raises the problem of spontaneity and inertia in relation to consciousness.
As we have shown in Chapter One, Sartre’s early work is also explicitly concerned with
the relations between the spontaneous and the static as regards consciousness. Let us at once
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reintroduce the levels of consciousness defined by Sartre in TOE. The first level of consciousness
is unreflected consciousness. This consciousness is the primordial consciousness of the lifeworld. It is first of all defined by its spontaneity; unreflected consciousness is that consciousness
which intuits the irreversible temporality of life, as it unfolds as a series of objects through which
unreflected consciousness finds its unity. Secondly, unreflected consciousness cannot be made
objective by itself; to know itself as unreflected is a property of its existence, rendering
objectification on this level unnecessary and impossible. When an unreflected consciousness is
taken as an object, is done so by a reflecting consciousness. Reflecting consciousness is itself
unreflected, spontaneous, but has the added property of taking for its object a previously
unreflected consciousness. That now-objectified unreflected consciousness then becomes a
reflected consciousness.
Again, the example of hatred helps clear up the interactions between these levels of
consciousness. For Sartre, in any given interaction with an object, those states and qualities
which help to color that object are somehow given as automatic; the states that inhere during
these interactions, such as hatred, are expressed through the object, and the relation between the
two seem resolute, opaque, and beyond change. However, according to Sartre, spontaneous
disgust for something or someone is simply a temporal act of unreflected consciousness. It is
upon reflection that hatred is prescribed as the cause of the previous feeling of distaste. So
whereas one’s unreflected feeling of disgust seems to emanate from hatred, and the spontaneous
feeling of disgust is therefore coupled to the state of hatred, the opposite is true: it is only
through an act of reflecting consciousness that hatred appears as a state. During reflection, hatred
is found to be something that exists regardless of time x or time y during which disgust was felt.
Hatred is therefore a synthetic unity of any number of unreflected consciousness of disgust, and
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is consequently an object, existing outside any specific act of consciousness. Therefore, the
moment of disgust for the hated object, whether a thing or another person, is not hatred but an
unreflected consciousness. The explanatory state of hatred, as well as states in general, are not,
therefore, synonymous with unreflected consciousness, since states are both a product and
producer of the ego.
Throughout his description of the ego, Sartre underlines its elusive nature, emphasizing
“the profound irrationality of the notion of an ego” (Sartre 81). This irrationality stems from the
fact that the ego is at once creative, like consciousness, and passive, like an object. For example,
Sartre remarks that “the ego is the spontaneous, transcendent unity of our states and our actions,”
and that, like consciousness, “this mode of creation is indeed a creation ex nihilio” (76-77).
However, Sartre goes on to comment that “this spontaneity must not be confused with the
spontaneity of consciousness. Indeed, the ego, being an object, is passive” (79). Although states
and actions seem immediately coupled, and therefore attributable, to the spontaneity of the ego,
the latter maintains a sort of passivity in which those states and actions, by virtue of finding
expression through the ego, impress themselves upon and change the ego in the process. In order
for states to be expressed spontaneously, there must be a certain separation between the ego and
the states, as well as a creative component to the ego; in order for things to be attributed to the
creativity of the ego, there must be the availability for the ego to be marked by the expression of
the states. This leads Sartre to conclude that “the ego is opaque like an object” and that “the
linkage of the ego to the states remains, therefore, an unintelligible spontaneity” (78, 80).
Despite its unintelligibility, Sartre provides the method of production and reception of the
ego as an opaque object:
the ego is an object apprehended, but also an object constituted, by reflective
consciousness. The ego is a virtual locus of unity, and consciousness constitutes it in a
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direction contrary to that actually by the production: really, consciousnesses are first;
through these are constituted states; and then, through the latter, the ego is constituted.
But, as the order is reversed by a consciousness which imprisons itself in the world in
order to flee from itself, consciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states as
produced by the ego. (81)
Therefore, by objectifying consciousness, reflective consciousness creates an object imbued with
explanatory potential for past acts of consciousness that seemingly cannot be refuted or reversed.
Separation and Simulation
It is here that we may to draw a definitive comparison between the productions of the ego
and the more-than-real, which requires that we guide our ensuing schema with the dual
operations of separation and simulation. Baudry states that “actually, cinema is a simulation
apparatus;” in order to explain the way in which structures inherent to reality, whether
consciousness, ego, or dream, are in cinema made formal and inert, we must look at what the
apparatus accomplishes through simulation (Baudry 118). The more-than-real involves more
than the propagation of the artistic convention of the eye-subject: the more-than-real, both in
dream and cinema, also involves the extraction of elements of lived reality in order to produce a
reality-effect that reality itself cannot offer.
Following from separation and simulation, we are then dealing with the questions of
hypostatization and consequential alteration. Not only do Sartre and Baudry see the objects of
their studies as possessing qualities of that which they modify, they credit that possession with
the resultant modification. In Sartre, for example, the “unintelligible spontaneity” of the ego is an
objectifying condensation of the spontaneity of consciousness that compromises that very
spontaneity: “this spontaneity [of the ego], represented and hypostatized in an object, becomes a
degraded and bastardized spontaneity, which magically preserves its creative power even while
becoming passive” (Sartre 81). Concerned with the preservation of spontaneous consciousness,
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Sartre argues that the ego separates from consciousness a part of its structure—spontaneity—and
simulates it, thus resulting in an alteration to spontaneity. The ego behaves like consciousness,
but due to its simulation of the properties of consciousness, it becomes something else.
Baudry, on the other hand, focuses on the way in which cinema separates and simulates
elements of the dream situation in order to produce a waking reality-effect that the merely
existential is incapable of rendering. He reminds us that it is simulation which separates dreams
and cinema, arguing that “one cannot hesitate to insist on the artificial nature of the cine-subject.
It is precisely this artificiality which differentiates it from dream or hallucinations” (Baudry 122).
Dream itself separates components of waking reality in order to lend its representations a real
charge; this separation and implementation in the dream results in the more-than-real of the
dream. Cinema in turn further separates aspects both structurally of and conducive to dream, and
operates by “transforming a perception into a quasi-hallucination endowed with real-effect which
cannot be compared to that which results from ordinary perception” (122). The point for Baudry
is that while dream is a response to a desire for a pre-subjective wholeness, “a vestige of the
subject’s phylogenetic past,” cinema is the simulation of that vestige (121). Therefore “whereas
dream, according to Freud, is merely a ‘normal hallucinatory psychosis,’” the simulation of that
psychosis results in a situation in which conscious subjects accede to a reality-effect not found in
reality (121). The more-than-real is a process that is cut off from the life-world, is more real than
the life-world, but takes place within the life-world.
Both these simulations find unity in the following theoretical difficulty: “in dream and
hallucination, representations are taken as reality in the absence of perception; in cinema, images
are taken for reality but require the mediation of perception” (Baudry 123). That is, wakeful
subjects, whose perception is not identical to that of dream, perceive the simulation of a dream
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state and still acquiesce to its reality-effect. Apparatus cinema only works if real, temporal
perception halts itself within the non-dialectic time of the more-than-real. To put things back into
Sartrean terms, the transcendental subject simulates and conflates unreflected and reflecting
consciousness, consequently creating an ideological ego which informs and coheres the
representations intuited by the unreflected consciousness of the spectator. This achieves a realityeffect in which spontaneous representational experience provides the assurance of coherent
ideological meaning.
Schemas of the More-Than-Real
We will now finally schematize the process by which the transcendental subject produces
the ego of the apparatus as well its involvement in the production of the more-than-real. This will
occur over two separate schemas: the first schema will demonstrate the construction of the
cinematic ego; the second will then describe the emergence of the more-than-real as a
consequence of that construction. The goal of the first schematization is to define the ego as a
simulation created by the apparatus as the unperceived source of ideological representational
meaning;6 the second sets out to illustrate how the interaction between the transcendental subject
and the unreflected consciousness of the spectator produces the more-than-real.
A note on methodology: throughout this project, I have repeatedly referred to “the
transcendental subject” both specifically and generally. This is because the concept itself is
something both exact and broad: in one sense, it is specifically enacted and embodied by the
camera, while in another sense that embodiment creates a general subject-effect. In what follows,
“the transcendental subject” refers specifically to an effect produced by the behavior of the
camera in projection, in the general projection situation assumed by apparatus theory, as
according to the different levels of consciousness outlined by Sartre’s philosophy. The ego of the
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apparatus, or the subject-effect, is consequently created by this behavior and its constitution will
be described as such.
Schema of the Ego as Constituted By the Transcendental Subject
1. The camera is a permanently reflecting consciousness. Reflecting consciousness is
itself unreflected. It is spontaneous in its temporality. The difference between reflecting
consciousness and unreflected consciousness is that reflecting consciousness takes a former
unreflected consciousness as its object. The transcendental subject as-act-of-consciousness is
reflecting: it is unreflected as an ex nihilio “unfolding of images” (the temporal reality of the
projection), but is also reflecting in that it posits a subject of filmic representation to which these
images belong.
2. The objects posited by this reflecting consciousness—filmic representations—are
themselves spontaneously intended objects. Their effacement as differentiated objects (the premovement stills of Baudry’s “denial of difference” in “IE,” or image-objects) coheres, in the first
place, in their restoration as movement-images. The transcendental subject as a reflecting
consciousness is responsible for this primary cohesion.
2a. This reflecting consciousness, while embodied by the camera, is not simply
synonymous with the camera, either as “site of inscription” or metaphorical interlocutor. The
transcendental subject is not synonymous with all camera-work, projection, or cinematic
representation. The unreflected nature of the unfolding image-objects can ostensibly be
foregrounded and even intuited as such; this is the goal of materialist film (to which we return
below).
2b. The transcendental subject therefore effaces the unreflected nature of these imageobjects, their objectivity, in order to constitute representation “in a direction contrary” to its
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materiality. Whereas a film practice emphasizing the unreflected aspect of the image-object
would result in the alternating, dialectical cohesion and incoherence of meaning, the
transcendental subject, by its act of reflection, achieves the primary cohesion above and the
attribution of the representation to a state. This results in the reflected-image.
2c. In Sartre, the state is the objective unity of any number of unreflected
consciousnesses, and is given as inert and existent outside any specific unreflected
consciousness; in Baudry, the image of reflected representation is the unity of disparate imageobjects, and is given as the expression of a state-of-meaning inert and existent outside any
certain (a) reflected-image or (b) film in which reflected-images appear.
2d. This “state-of-meaning” exists as non-dialectical and is ideologically static; no
matter what permutations may appear to effect it, infuse it with nuance, the state remains the
unifying principle of meaning according to the reflecting act of the transcendental subject.
Speaking on identification in “dominant cinema,” Peter Gidal writes that “capitalist consumption
reifies not only the structures of the economic base but also the constructs of abstraction.
Concepts, then, do not produce concepts; they become, instead, ensconced as static ‘ideas’ which
function to maintain the ideological class war and its invisibility, the state apparatus in all its
fields” (Gidal, “TSM,” luxonline.org.uk). These “static ideas” can be conceived of as Sartrean
states, belonging to overall state-of-meaning, which color the reflected-image (the image
comprised of image-objects, the image held into a representation) with various shades of
meaning inherent to the property system.
3. The space from which these states are produced is therefore the ideological ego of the
property system; the property system is present at the moment of the reflected-image’s cohesion
as the expression of the state-of-meaning. Sartre states that “the ego is to psychical objects”—
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and by psychical objects Sartre means unities produced by reflection—“what the World is to
things” (Sartre 75). What this means is that the ego is the totality of all states, qualities, and
actions insofar as they are both potential and actualized in thought and by consciousness, just as
the World is “conceived of as the infinite synthetic totality of all things” (74-75). The difference
between the World and the ego, however, is that whereas the World does not often give itself ashorizon, “the ego, on the contrary, always appears at the horizon of states. Each state, each action
is given as incapable of being separated from the ego without abstraction” (75). Extrapolating
this incapability to the apparatus, we say: with every reflected-image as created by the
transcendental subject comes an ideological ego to which each reflected-image points back as its
source of sense and meaning.
To be clear, we here immediately approach the problematic of a spatial conception of the
ego and of ideology. Such a thesis seems untenable: as Stephen Heath notes, ideology cannot
simply be conceived as a place where representations reside, awaiting their deployment by
whatever mystifying enterprise requires their service. Nor can it be depicted as outside reality,
whether mental or otherwise: “this imaginary relation in ideology is itself real, which means not
simply that the individuals live it as such (the mode of illusion, the inverted image [in Marx]) but
that is effectively, practically, the reality of their concrete existence, the term of their subject
positions, the basis of their activity, in a given social order” (Heath 5). We do not aim to solve
this issue at this moment, nor do we intend to merely explain away this problematic by
comparing the relation between ego and ideology as “magical,” as Sartre characterizes the
relation between ego and consciousness. However, we must make clear that by “ideology” we
mean a relatively autonomous structure of representational density in which static configurations
of the life-world find expression through institutions and subjects.

63

What absolves the cinematic apparatus from the critique of ideology-as-autonomous
space, is that, again, cinema is a space—a space of simulation. It is a formalized, systemic space,
with both physical and mental components; it could therefore very well be a formalization of
certain ideological conditions. We immediately reiterate: cinema is a formalized institution,
comprised of mental and physical structures, within the dialectical life-world; it is not the
dialectical life-world. Therefore the sedimentation of certain dynamic structures and processes in
an apparatus of representation is available for theoretical scrutiny. Put another way, in the
apparatus the transcendental subject endlessly (re)produces of the Sartrean ego, whereas in the
non-cinematic life-world there is respite from the ego, just as in the waking life-world there is
respite from the dream. The transcendental subject is the formal imposition of the Sartrean ego in
cinema, created in order to produce a precise ideological effect: the more-than-real. If ideology is
not spatial or wholly formal, its reproduction and subsistence in the apparatus is.
With the structure of the transcendental subject and ego in place, we now move into the
process by which the more-than-real is created and sustained.
Schema of the More-Than-Real as Interaction Between Spectator and the Transcendental
Subject>Ego Relation
1. The consciousness of the apparatus spectator is assumed as unreflected.
2. Before intuiting any reflected-images or the ego from which they emanate, the
spectator’s unreflected consciousness intuits the transcendental subject. It is not simply that the
spectator takes up the position of the transcendental subject, effacing its role in the production of
the more-than-real. The transcendental subject is part of the intuition by the spectator precisely
because it is simulated and objectified. It is a recognized, partially disavowed, objective
interiority.
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2a. The unreflected consciousness of the spectator consequently intuits the
transcendental subject as-consciousness; the unreflected consciousness of the spectator is
therefore itself a reflective consciousness.
2b. This reflective consciousness of the spectator, however, takes as its object not simply
a consciousness as-conscious, but also the relation between the transcendental subject and the
ego; the object intuited by the spectator is the process of the construction of the ego. Sartre
comments that the ego presents itself to reflective consciousness “as interiority closed upon
itself. [The ego] is inward for itself, not for consciousness” (Sartre 84). In phenomenology,
interiority refers to the reflexivity, or, more simply, the subjectivity, of consciousness, the fact
that consciousness is aware of itself as-consciousness. Now, interiority is for Sartre a condition
of consciousness; it is a condition of subjectivity and therefore need not, and cannot, be posited
by unreflected consciousness. However, in the case of the ego, by virtue of its production by
reflection, interiority becomes static and opaque: subjectivity is paradoxically objectified.
Extrapolating this objectified interiority to the apparatus, we may next state:
2c. Since both the ego and the production of the ego by the transcendental subject are
objectified in the apparatus, and since the consciousness of the spectator is itself reflective, a
secondary abstraction occurs in the apparatus situation that results in a doubled “interiority
closed upon itself.”
2d. This is because the ego must be avowed yet effaced in the intuition of the spectator; it
must be both immediate and peripheral; if the ego is to go both noticed and unnoticed, it must
therefore be given as imparting unity to a consciousness separate from the spectator. Recall that
both the eye-subject and the ego produced by the transcendental subject follow the same “reverse
production:” with the eye-subject, the coordinates of perspective produce the representation,
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while the representation seems to produce the coordinates; similarly, although the cinematic ego
is present through every reflected-image, is pointed to as the source of meaning, the reflectedimage is also given as self-evident.
Concerned as we are with the apparatus situation, the apparatus “in reality,” in wakinglife, we see that the question then becomes: what is it about this structural relation, this intuition
as both producer and production, that (a) presents the spectator with an irrefutable ego, yet (b)
keeps the ego hidden within the reflected-image?
This question derives from the Sartrean problematic of whether or not one can ever truly
apprehend the ego outside reflection; that is, is there ever a transparent, unreflected apprehension
of the ego? In Sartrean phenomenology, the answer is no. Sartre notes that “what radically
prevents the acquisition of real cognitions of the ego is the very special way in which it is given
to reflective consciousness. The ego never appears, in fact, except when one is not looking at it”
(Sartre 88). That is, “the reflective gaze” can never jump over the reflected experience, or the
state which apparently informs it, in order to directly intuit the ego (88). It must rather go
through the unreflected experience and the state, a process which mires the reflected
consciousness in a number of levels. Hence Sartre’s conclusion that the ego is “never seen except
‘out of the corner of the eye,’” that “in trying to apprehend the ego for itself and as a direct
object of my consciousness, I fall back onto the unreflected level, and the ego disappears along
with the reflective act” (88-89).
As we are attempting to demonstrate, the apparatus requires that the ego not disappear
but somehow give itself on the unreflected level. For if the spectator’s perceptual intervention is
unreflected, no ego would appear within the reflected-image. The difference between the lifeworld subject and the unreflected consciousness of the spectator, however, is crucial here: the
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spectator confronts the ego both directly, in terms of the permanent reflection of the
transcendental subject and the ego-process, and indirectly, by virtue of the spectator’s own
unreflected and reflective consciousness. For the unreflected consciousness of the spectator, the
primary object of intuition is the continual production of the cinematic ego, which is the result of
the reflective transcendental subject. Like Sartre’s subject, who cannot attain the ego outside
reflective process, the spectator moves through the reflected consciousness, the state-of-meaning
in order to arrive at a peripheral ego of ideology. However, the ego never disappears from the
apparatus situation precisely because, per 2a. and 2b., a spontaneous consciousness, via the
action of the transcendental subject, irrevocably tied to the explanatory power of the ego, is
always spontaneously present in the intuition of the spectator.
3. The spectator therefore spontaneously, in the life-world of the apparatus experience,
apprehends “the ego as a direct object;” the spectator intuis an “unfolding of images” that is
itself spontaneously given as emanating from a position impossible in non-cinematic reality: a
temporal unity of unreflected, reflective, and reflected consciousness.
4. The interaction between the spectator and the transcendental subject therefore results
in Baudry’s clearest definition of the more-than-real, the “obtaining from reality a position, a
condition in which what is perceived would no longer be distinguished from representations;”
unreflected spontaneity and ego, which are themselves separated in pure phenomenological
experience, are in the apparatus experience no longer separable; through the reflective intuition
of permanent reflection, the reflected-objects give themselves as irreversible depictions of the
possible permutations of the state-of-meaning produced by the ego of ideology (Baudry 121).
5. The more-than-real is thus an effect of the interaction between the transcendental
subject (as unreflected consciousness, as reflective consciousness, as creator of the ego) and the
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spectator (as unreflected consciousness, as reflecting consciousness) in which the spectator
spontaneously occupies the impossible position of “interiority closed upon itself.”
Implications
What does it mean that “the spectator occupies the impossible position of interiority
closed upon itself”? Let us return to that “position” of which Baudry speaks, desired by his
historical subject of representation, where unconscious representation and external perception
reside in undifferentiated bliss. “Interiority closed upon itself” is precisely that position.
Apparatus cinema allows one to exist in a paradoxical exteriorized intimacy, the same refuge one
may take in the ego, of which Sartre says, “quite simply, the ego is an object which appears only
to reflection, and which is thereby radically cut off from the World. The ego does not live on the
same level” (Sartre 83). The reason for this is that “just as the ego is an irrational synthesis of
interiority and passivity, it is a synthesis of interiority and transcendence” (83).
So it is with the more-than-real: in apparatus cinema, the representation, the reflectedimage, is both objective and subjective, inside and outside, of the world and outside its reach.
The more-than-real is ideological relations experienced as though they were happenstance
intervention within a stable reality principle. It is the experience of mass subjectivity as though it
were an actual, personalized subjectivity. It is the I of ideology. In the apparatus situation, taken
as a whole, reality is separated off from reality and then given back to the spectator in reality.
“The red red vino on tap” seen by Alex is not not-real-blood but rather simulated blood given to
a simulation of the consciousness that would encounter real blood in the life-world. This is
precisely what makes the blood on the screen “seem really real:” when the consciousness that
intuits reality is separated from reality and then given back in reality, reality is no longer real, but
“really real,” or more-than-real.
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It in this manner that we must understand Ellis’ argument that in apparatus cinema,
“reality unfolds itself, addressed implicitly to a voyeur whose presence is acknowledged by the
film’s pretence that it is not overlooked” (Ellis 60). The empty unreflected consciousness
towards which the transcendental subject addresses its reflected-image is this very implicit
“voyeur,” a big Other to whom relates the apparatus spectator much like Lacan’s visitors to
Doges’ Palace (Lacan 113).7 Carroll objects that “the very notion sounds peculiar, even
mystical,” glibly asking, “what is involved in ‘reality narrating itself,’ over and above the
illusion of reality? A close encounter of the third kind with a Hegelian zeitgeist” (Carroll, MM
121-122). The answer is plain: “reality unfolding itself” is the result of a simulation apparatus
that fuses a disavowed, structurally reproduced unreflected consciousness and a static horizon of
meaning in order to make the reproduction of ideologically-cemented representations, and their
connotations, appear in the same manner as spontaneous reality.
The thing to keep in mind, when considering the dual separateness and proximity of the
more-than-real in terms of “reality unfolding itself,” is the cold, objective indifference on the part
of the apparatus image. Returning for a moment to psychoanalysis, let us invoke the division
made by Lacan between eye and gaze (Lacan 67-119). According to Lacan, the geometrics of the
eye as-organ are separate from “the gaze,” or the object-cause of desire in the visual field (74,
91-104). The eye and the gaze are thus “split” and in constant play with one another. As it vies
for omnipotence, to make itself the owner of representation,8 the eye instead finds itself at the
mercy of the gaze, which piques the former’s interest and freezes its function. “Vision,” that is,
“seeing,” is therefore first a matter of desiring-to-see; the mobilization of desire in the visual
field is a requisite for representation. Therefore despite its function as an ordering organ of light
and form, what the eye “sees” is satisfactory on the unconscious level, on a level beyond
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biology. Despite the facticity of the central point that is the eye, the gaze is in fact the point of
captivation in vision.
Now, imagine Baudry’s spectator sitting in a modern movie theater, occupying that
position of “interiority enclosed upon itself,” or objectified subjectivity. Carroll is right; the
spectator may stand up, move from row to row, and retain all narrative cohesion and perhaps
even affect. What Carroll misses, however, is the while the eye is mobile, the point of the gaze is
not. In order to partake in the film, in the narrative and its affect, its discourse, whatever, the
spectator must still accede his eye in order to achieve that position of unreflected reflection
integral to the apparatus. He must still recognize the gaze as the enactment of a desire-to-see in
order to enter the apparatus; there is still a “laying down of the gaze” on the part of the spectator
(Lacan 114). In addition to all the other structural necessities we have outlined, it is this
accession that ensures the persistence of an “artificial regression” in which available motoricity,
as noted by Laplance and Pontalis, does not prevent the hallucinatory, phantasmatic blending of
subjective and objective positions. Vision elides itself as an organ for “seeing,” for perceiving
and thus differentiating, and “reality unfolds itself.”
The apparatus therefore offers a satisfaction in the form of a sustained, seemingly nonsubjective, bewildered meditation on the world. It is an apparatus of the spectacle: “apprehended
in a partial way, reality unfolds in a new generality as a pseudo-world apart, solely as an object
of contemplation” (Debord 12). We need not even cling to the above example of the classical
spectator for this structural deliberation to retain its present self-evidence. Certainly the
apparatus experience described above, the movie theater of Baudry’s time, is itself historical and
thus is in no way demonstrative of “cinema” in its essence.9 What of it? Forget the esoteric
imagery of the apparatus, the profuse, varicolored aura of meaning washing outward, onto and
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into the spectator; accession to narrative rumination, in the form of mobilized viewing, has
simply become a quiet antidote to the banality of empty time in the capitalist life-world.
Bonitzer’s “automatic ideological action” reigns today as ubiquitous solace. A young
professional enduring a commute by marginally engaging with affective narrative exposes more
about the ideological stake of “the apparatus” than any classical spectator hypothetically
captivated by the point of the Lacanian gaze. At least the latter involved some level of
grandiosity. In its very dual (a) insidiousness within the life-world and (b) exile from academia,
the apparatus has become perfunctory, another fueling station en route to the alienated
conclusion of dead time spent. We have never understood how one could fail to notice the
profound melancholy involved in exteriorized intimacy.
This could all of course be another way of saying that the apparatus helps to accomplish,
in representation, “the reproduction of the conditions of production” (Althusser 127, 153-54).
This in turn leaves us open to the attack of determinism, of which Althusser’s theory of
“ideology in general” has been accused (159). Douglas Kellner, for example, argues that
Althusser incorrectly ahistoricizes ideology so as to efface its very history as a concept and
install it as a metaphysical psychic and social mechanism invaluable to any working society.
Kellner sees in this thesis a crass and pessimistic determinism, in which no one may ever escape
the Althusserian paradigm (Kellner 56-57). Similarly, Bonitzer criticizes Baudry for his
generalized and mystical use of terms such as “cinema,” “ideology,” “repressive system,” and so
on, concluding that “the apparatus” is a theoretical monolith that immediately “forecloses” actual
film analysis; this foreclosure prevents a proper theorization and realization of a materialist film
practice (Bonitzer 298-305). The common thread of accusation between these criticisms is that
the structures produced by either theorist are unable to account for any phenomena outside the
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restricted range of their concepts, which results in their untenable status as theories capable of
explaining everything (everything ideological, everything cinematic, respectively).
THE VALUE OF DETERMINISM AND MATERIALIST FILM
Let us focus on Bonitzer’s criticism. I argue that it is precisely my recourse to unreflected
consciousness that not only legitimatizes the notion of a determinant apparatus but also, by virtue
of that very determinism, points to the potential for a non-apparatus cinema. By grounding both
of Baudry’s essays in a consistent philosophical system, we have illustrated how a more-thanreal effect in the cinema is logically produced. Both the transcendental subject and the morethan-real are therefore transfigured into something more than metaphor, and the determinism of
the apparatus becomes something concrete and defensible. However, it does not follow that this
configuration, this psychical and physical apparatus, is the exhaustive account of all possible
cinematic practice, whether in terms of technology or dispositif. Unreflected spontaneity, while
fastened to the ego in the apparatus, can also manifest as the subversion of such a suture.
The potential for such subversion is most clearly expressed by materialist film, or the
film practice which aims to not merely depict the materiality of film, both of the film astechnology and as-psychical-work, but to create that materiality in time, in the projection
situation. Comparing “classical” and “materialist” cinema, Pascal Bonitzer writes
The classical scene is divided, and assumed to be complete in each of its fragments. The
‘materialist’ scene is divided, and is constructed-destroyed in the articulation and
dialectical interaction of its fragments. The ‘materialist’ scene is worked out within an
irreducible heterogeneity, where the homogenous classical scene represents by
abstracting a general volume of contradictions, for which it thus becomes a dead location.
(Bonitzer 302)
Materialist cinema thus works on the signifier in its very nominalism, as opposed to preventing
its materiality by enforcing cohesion in the reflection-image.
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We are best able to connect the determinism of the apparatus to materialist film practice
by linking the spontaneity of unreflected consciousness with Gidal’s notion of “arbitrariness.”
Gidal, a Structuralist/Materialist filmmaker and theorist, writes that “the concept of
‘arbitrariness’ is based on the political demand that nothing be accepted as natural. This is not a
denial of meanings but rather a recognition of the imposition of ideologies” (Gidal, MF 11). In
materialist film, those meanings which inhere in apparatus representation are disallowed their
unity by and through the materialist practice of representational denial: “‘arbitrariness’ in sound
and image each moment goes against granting a fullness to an image moment” (11). To put
things in terms of the above schema, it is not that the reflected-image is merely omitted, but that
its construction is never allowed to be intuited as anything but construction: “each ‘image
moment’ thus does not mean a moment of ‘fullness,’ it merely designates moment, not static, not
essential, not somehow quintessentially ontologically ‘filmic,’ simply a clinical description of a
moment or piece of time” (11). Again, in Sartrean terms: Gidal here stresses the imperative of
the construction of image-objects as image-objects in true unreflected cinematic experience, as
opposed to image-objects immediately welded to the state-of-meaning and subsequently
experienced in the static denial of temporality imposed by the apparatus experience.
Indeed, what separates materialist film from dominant apparatus cinema is that it
“attempts,” in its arbitrariness, “the constant construction of non-identity,” which for Gidal “is a
break from infinitude and eternity, which a religiously capitalist patriarchy attempts to designate
and reproduce” (Gidal, MF 12). Non-identity can in the context of the apparatus be understood
as the attempt to produce a cinematic experience that comes as close to the unreflected as
possible. This is not undertaken simply to create filmic spontaneity for its own sake as a
convention; were this the case, “a phrase such as ‘image moment,’ even within a description of
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the materialist concept ‘arbitrariness, could reinveigle itself as a metaphysic of film” (11).
Rather, what is at stake in materialist film is the production of the contradictions between the
temporal and the inert, or, for our purposes, to produce the construction and obliteration of the
ego.
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CHAPTER 3: THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT AND IDEOLOGY
What follows is a brief application of the theory of the transcendental subject to the
theory of ideology proffered by Louis Althusser, who argues that ideology is an ahistorical
operation that structurally produces subjects. The rationale for this application is the fact that
Althusser, whether in letter or a general structuralist spirit, explicitly and implicitly informs the
impetus and vocabulary of apparatus theory; the very name “Althusser” governs apparatus theory
as its master signifier. While this exercise offers itself as rhetorically, and, according to the
conclusions hitherto reached, logically prescriptive, the following account is by no means
exhaustive. We only aim to respectfully re-examine an inspiration of our main object of study.
In “On Screen, in Frame: Film and Ideology,” Stephen Heath denotes cinema as the site
of connection between psychoanalysis and Marxism:
Cinema brings historical materialism and psychoanalysis together in such a way that the
consideration of film and ideology begins from and constantly returns us to their
conjuncture, in such a way that from the analysis of cinema, of film, we may be able to
engage with theoretical issues of a more general scope, issues critical for a materialist
analysis of ideological institutions and practices. (Heath 4)
Heath justifies this extension of film theory to historical materialism with a simultaneous appeal
to Marx’s notion of the ideological camera obscura and Freud’s description of the unconscious
as a photographic negative which finds its positivity in consciousness (2). Heath is after not only
a theory of film, but also the implications of ideological film theory and criticism for a general
theory of capitalist subjectivity, or the subject of ideology.
Heath understands ideology in the Althusserian sense, expressed by the well-worn
formula, “ideology is a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relations of individuals to their real
conditions of existence” (Althusser 162). Following Althusser’s criticism of the “mechanistic”
and “hermeneutic” explanations of ideology, Heath reminds us that ideology is not itself simply
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a negative illusion that, once exposed and understood, leaves us with a real: “this imaginary
relation in ideology is itself real, which means not simply that the individuals live it as such (the
mode of illusion, the inverted image [in Marx]) but that it is effectively, practically, the reality of
their concrete existence, the term of their subject positions, the basis of their activity, in a given
social order” (Althusser 162-65, Heath 5). Furthermore, “reality—as against ideology, as its
truth—is posed only in process in the specific contradictions of a particular socio-historical
moment” (Heath 5). Therefore, ideology is not not-reality, and reality is not not-ideology; reality
is the “confrontation” between the two. Ideology is therefore “productive within a mode of
production…the ideological instance determines the definition, the reproduction, of individuals
as agents/subjects for the mode of production, in the positions it assigns them” (5-6).
Despite its emphasis on the material, what makes Althusser’s theory of ideology
problematic is its possibly idealist retention of and expansion on the thesis, “ideology has no
history” (Althusser 159). Althusser argues that the Marx of The German Ideology intended this
maxim to denote ideology as “a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness” (159). Since
“history,” during this period of Marx’s work, is understood only as “the history of concrete
individuals” and their material intervention in class struggle, the “pure dream” that is ideology
“has no history of its own” (160). Althusser intervenes by distinguishing between “ideologies,”
which do in fact “have a history of their own,” and “ideology in general,” which itself “has no
history, not in a negative sense (its history is external to it) but in an absolutely positive sense”
(160-161). Therefore “ideology in general” is a structural recursion required by ideologies that is
both transcendent to them but required for their existences as ideologies (159).
This recursion is the classical notion of the subject; Althusser’s “central thesis” of his
theory of ideology in general is expressed by his other well-known formula, “all ideology hails
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or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of
the subject” (Althusser 173). In fact, Althusser goes so far as to argue that “the category of the
subject (which may function under other names: e.g., as the soul in Plato, as God, etc.) is the
constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination (regional or class) and whatever
its historical date—since ideology has no history” (171). This categorical Subject creates
subjects out of individuals through “the ideological recognition function;” individuals recognize
themselves as possessing a beckoned place in the social world, and are immediately interpellated
as subjects. Thus follows the conclusion that “individuals are always-already subjects;” as
illustrated by Althusser’s examples, such as answering a knock at the door, turning one’s head at
hearing “‘Hey, you there,’” or even assimilating to language, one becomes subject through the
immediacy of recognition (171-172, 174).
Heath quotes at length Paul Q. Hirst’s take on Althusserian interpellation regarding this
fundamental requirement of recognition:
Recognition, the crucial moment of the constitution (activation) of the subject,
presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition. Something must recognise that
which it is to be…The social function of ideology is to constitute concrete individuals
(not-yet-subjects) as subjects. The concrete individual is “abstract,” it is not yet the
subject it will be. It is, however, already a subject in the sense of the subject which
supports the process of recognition. Thus something which is not a subject must already
have the faculties necessary to support the recognition which will constitute it as a
subject. It must have a cognitive capacity as a prior condition of its place in the process of
recognition. Hence the necessity of the distinction in which the faculties of the latter are
supposed already in the former (unless of course cognition be considered a “natural”
human faculty). (Hirst in Heath 103)
Keeping in mind Heath’s thesis that questions of film bear on questions of ideology, we ask:
could not the Althusserian subject of ideology in fact be the transcendental subject, as realized by
our revisionary importation of Sartrean phenomenology, which in fact considers unreflected
consciousness “a ‘natural’ human faculty”? For to say that ideology has no history of its own,
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“not in a negative sense…but in an absolutely positive sense,” can only mean that the subject of
ideology has been rendered so negative that whatever it intuits, whatever it sees and recognizes
in its unreflected acts, has no choice but to be positive. Althusser’s subject is in fact an ex nihilo
consciousness which is itself not an existent but which only produces existence.
The appeal made by Althusser to “obviousness” helps makes things clearer. Althusser
notes that “for you and for me, the category of the subject is a primary ‘obviousness’
(obviousnesses are always primary)…the ‘obviousness’ that you and I are subjects—and that that
does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect”
(Althusser 171). Is not the transcendental subject itself responsible for producing a primary
“obviousness,” the state-of-meaning for-unreflected consciousness, a representational
obviousness “which we cannot fail to recognize” (172)? Are we not expected, as spectators, to
already understand a certain economy of semiotic and psychological association as permitted by
both this obviousness and the state-of-meaning to which it is coupled? Combining our terms with
the phrasing of Hirst, we may say that by simulating unreflected consciousness and welding it
permanently to reflection, the transcendental subject produces a situation “in which the faculties
of the latter are supposed already in the former.”
Let us thus pronounce resolutely: the subject of ideology behaves in a similar manner to
the transcendental subject. Once an experience is reflected, that is, once an experience is
attributed to an origin, a condition, etc., we are in reflection, or the state-of-meaning;
consequently, in an act of mass reflection, an object appears: ideology. Furthermore, because
every consciousness is, in the last instance, unreflected, is negative, and is-always-happening,
that ideology-object is always taken by unreflected consciousness, and thus is always reproduced
and always present. And because the ultimate origin and alibi of the abstract capitalist code must
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be that there is a reality, ideology, in the last instance, is reality. The two simply cannot be
separated out. Therefore, the ideology of Reality, the Reality-object, accompanies an already-real
unreflected consciousness; proven, controlled, considered Reality accompanies something which
cannot help but be real, in the strict sense we have given above.
That is why, for Althusser, ideology is both a deception (méconnaissance) and an
unavoidable aspect of the social. It is obvious why the subject of ideology must find its model in
an existential structure of consciousness: ideology must be an I, for two reasons:
1. The subject of ideology must be the same transcendent unity for all involved; if it was
not, the social, i.e. mass consciousness, could not be bonded together;
this is because
2. The subject of ideology must also be an I that allows every participating I to involve its
own imaginary ego-unity in the ideological unity.
Thus the subject of ideology is a doubled I that is completely malleable and impossible to rip
from consciousness. There is simply no reason why Sartre’s proclamation that “the I is deceptive
from the start” cannot be applied to ideology, an application which in fact shatters theories of
illusion and offers us a stark condition, perhaps the only condition: if the I is definitionally
deceptive from the start, then the reflected I of the social, the transcendental I of ideology, is
deceptive as well (Sartre 52). Althusser’s indictment of Hegel, that “Hegel is (unknowingly) an
admirable ‘theoretician’ of ideology,” could perhaps be extended to Sartre and his early
phenomenology (Althusser 181).
Keeping in mind the schematization of the transcendental subject we have produced in
the previous chapter, let us hypothesize that the subject of ideology, as defined by Althusser,
operates in the following manner:
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1. The subject of ideology simulates unreflected consciousness, which is negative to the
point of positivity, real in a non-proven or considered sense, always-happening, and intentional.
Sartre wonders “if one cannot conceive of absolutely impersonal consciousness” (Sartre 37).
This is precisely the simulation achieved by ideology. This impersonal consciousness is the
consciousness that exists anterior to the subjects interpellated by ideology.
2. The subject of ideology takes objects in acts of reflection which color those objects
with and through an ego, with and through a mass I, that service the reigning mode of
production, or the property system. Things appear to “just happen” when they are in actuality
coded. A paradoxical false facticity is established, in which things really do have no choice but
to happen, but are still objects of intention coded with meaning according to structural laws.
3. Thus, returning to interpellation, the individual who is hailed by ideology is hailed by
a structure of simulation and, despite whatever dissonance or assonance occurs from the clash
between “real conditions” and “imaginary relationships,” cannot help but heed the paradoxical
false facticity of the objects given to a) this simulation and b) the interpellated subject. Most
importantly, however, while he may recognize himself in specific instances of this structure (the
state/ideological apparatuses), the interpellated subject in the last instance identifies with the
simulation of consciousness itself; this identification thus secures the legitimacy and the
equivalency (which is integral to capitalist commodity and representation) of all ideologies
under the subsuming “ideology in general” advanced by Althusser.
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AFTERWORD
The above exercise is not intended to impart renewed validity to the Althusserian project.
Rather, I have included this application in order to offer some kind of determined and resolute
understanding of “the subject” so often referred to by Althusser; I have attempted to help us
arrive at a resolute understanding of the ideological subject so as to facilitate its supersession. In
This Is Not a Program, Tiqqun writes that “those who, as a final reprieve from their passivity,
insist on calling for a theory of the subject must understand that in the age of Bloom a theory of
the subject is now only possible as a theory of apparatuses” (Tiqqun 150). Throughout their call
for a “critical metaphysics” of capital, Tiqqun never explicitly define what they mean by
“apparatus;” however, it does now to note that “nothing ever happens in an apparatus,” and that
it is “the objective of every apparatus…to run and to govern a certain plane of phenomenality, to
ensure that a certain economy of presence persists” (151, 163).
An apparatus is therefore a machine of obviousness, an implementation of obviousness
intended to prevent the occurrence of any actual event. It is an apparatus which operates through
the behavior of subjects, not the other way around: “the only gratification that we can take from
this kind of exercise is to have performed in the apparatus with some panache. Virtuosity is the
only freedom—a pathetic freedom—gained by submitting to signifying determinisms” (Tiqqun
191). This manipulation of inert possibilities immediately invites comparison to Baudry: the
“apparatus” in Tiqqun’s sense is the existence of a human being within a phenomenal field as
created by a transcendental subject. In the life-world apparatus, one may only skillfully
manipulate the state-of-meaning offered by each apparatus situation; in in the cinematic
apparatus, the reflected-image may only exist as a permutation of the cinematic state-ofmeaning. Even the “just happening” of apparatus cinema is experienced in Tiqqun’s apparatus:
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“Hence the strikingly absent, lethargic character of existence within apparatuses, this
Bloomesque feeling of being carried away by the comforting flow of phenomena (198, emphasis
mine).
As a consequence of these comparisons, I re-introduce the value of determinism: if the
apparatus in cinema ensures a certain functioning of film; if the apparatus of the life-world
insures a certain functioning of phenomenal flow and capitalist life in general; and if the two are
in fact limits to the potential of both art and life; does not “a theory of apparatuses” require a
determined subject that one may identify and supersede?1 This is not to say that “a science of
apparatuses” per Tiqqun would need to take the form of the structuralist science of Althusser, but
rather involve itself in the play between the ossification of apparatus-being, the apparatus as it
exists in its non-time, and the actual bringing-into-being, through one’s actions, of the apparatus
(Tiqqun 179-181). Since “one is never initiated into an apparatus, only how it works,” we see
that it is a subject of obviousness that facilitates the denial of time and being in apparatuses;
perhaps bringing one’s initiation into being could serve some purpose in the dismantling of
apparatuses (175).
Finally, this is all to say the following: if one is concerned with materialist politics,
whether in representation or the life-world, one must take seriously the notion of the subject, not
in order to endlessly debate what/who that subject is, and certainly not in order to create a
revolutionary subject, but to understand what subjectivity is required by the property system as it
promulgates itself through the information and communication society. The point is not to reject
illusion for the sake of old maxims (the vulgarity of student groups who endlessly ask, “What is
the Left?”), nor to revel in representation itself as a potential semiotic emancipation (academic
cultural studies in general); rather, the point is recognize the increasing power of spectacle as it
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permeates through apparatuses that so easily blend unreflected experience and pre-reflected
orientation of phenomena. As Tiqqun pronounces:
WE WANT NEITHER VULGAR MATERIALISM NOR AN “ENCHANTED
MATERIALISM”; WHAT WE ARE DESCRIBING IS A MATERIALISM OF
ENCHANTMENT. (Tiqqun 174)
Is it is my hope that this project, in addition to providing a stronger, more definitive
understanding of the cinematic apparatus, could potentially provide some materials useful to “a
materialism of enchantment.”
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NOTES
INTRODUCTION: The Resuscitation of a Theory
1
The editorial note prefacing the original Film Quarterly publication of “Ideological Effects” also foregrounds that
“this questioning mode of thought turns from what it considers outmoded idealist of phenomenological doctrines
toward the type of radical and psychoanalytic thinking done by Lacan and toward an explicit sociopolitical analysis
of the film-making and film-viewing process” (Baudry, “IE” 39).
CHAPTER 1: The Transcendental Subject
1
This question was posed by Carroll in 1982: in “Address to the Heathen,” an article serving as an elaborate
refutation of both Stephen Heath’s Questions of Cinema and apparatus theory in general, Carroll plainly states, “I
[do not] understand why ideologically motivated film theorists are so preoccupied with attacking the transcendental
ego,” and even notes in passing that Sartre’s TOE is “an example, though probably an unsuccessful one, of a direct
confrontation with the Kantian variety of self-unity” (Carroll, “Address” 103).
2
In the ensuing discussion, the word “consciousness” appears many times, sometimes several times within one
sentence. Each instance will be qualified as to what kind of consciousness it is; for Sartre, the idea of consciousness
as being-in-the-world implies that consciousness transcends itself to objects; each objective transcendence is a
separate act of consciousness and, depending on what the object transcended-to is (in-itself, an object, or for-itself,
consciousness), these acts are different types of consciousnesses and produce different kinds of potentialities.
3
All following citations attributed to Baudry in this chapter refer to “IE” unless otherwise noted in-citation.
4
We are aware of the fact that the underlying Althusserian position which informs Baudry's argument exists today
largely as the contested and caricatured idea that once a veil is lifted from the eyes of those exploited under
capitalism, non-ideological knowledge will be created. Jacques Rancière well expresses this disdain in the following
passage:
The sociology of “misrecognition,” the theory of the 'spectacle' and the different forms assumed by the
critique of consumer and communication societies all share with Althusserianism the idea that the
dominated are dominated because they are ignorant of the laws of domination. This simplistic view at first
assigns to those who adopt it the exalted task of bringing their science to the blind masses. Eventually,
though, this exalted task dissolves into a pure thought of resentment which declares the inability of the
masses to take charge of their own destiny. (Rancière xvi)
Versions of this critique are also provided by certain psychoanalytic film theorists, who emphasize the socially
productive and discontinuous nature of ideology. See for example Heath (1981), Copjec (1994), and McGowan and
Kunkle (2004). While all valid criticisms, we presently extricate ourselves from debate over the conceptual validity
of ideological mystification.
5
For their part, Edward Buscombe, Christine Gledhill, Alan Lovell, and Christopher Williams, in their official
explanation for their resignation from the editorial board of Screen, question the validity of using “the Renaissance”
as the catch-all signifier of the imposition of a representational strategy resulting in a cinematic idealism (Buscombe
et. al 108).
6
This idea is proposed by Baudry in the opening pages of the essay: “...if we are to take account of the
imperfections of these instruments, their limitations, by what criteria may these be defined? If, for example, one can
speak of a restricted depth of field as a limitation, doesn't this term itself depend upon a particular conception of
reality for which such a limitation would not exist?” (Baudry, “IE” 40).
7
Peter Wollen has demonstrated the ways in which Bazin believed that the cinema possessed an internal, idealist
trajectory that would eventually lead to the eradication of film language and result in a completely self-effacing
cinema, which would present consciousness with the world in-itself. See Wollen (1976).
8
This is a rhetorical device utilized by other writers associated with structuralism such as Jean Baudrillard, who for
example argues that reproduction, that is, simulacra, is in fact the teleological impetus of capitalism (Baudrillard 9798). Terry Eagleton has written that in this way structuralism, as an intellectual movement, was simultaneously
radical and conservative; it removed the metaphysical façade from the social structures of capitalism, only to then
denote that façade as eternally inherent to capitalism outside of individual or historical activity. Structuralism is thus
an approach to capitalism that ends up “endorsing its logic while unmasking its ideals” (Eagleton 131).
9
Discussing “the Subject” of ideology, Althusser writes that “Hegel is (unknowingly) an admirable ‘theoretician’ of
ideology insofar as he is a ‘theoretician’ of Universal Recognition who unfortunately ends up in the ideology of
Absolute Knowledge” (Althusser 181).

84

Detmer adds, “Sartre suggests that since each consciousness are already embodied, and essentially tied to one
body, consciousnesses are already individuated, and no external cause for their individuation is required” (Detmer
25).
11
This is of course a reference to the well-known (although likely under-comprehended) concept of “suture,” or the
psychoanalytic account for the way in which the subject's construction hinges on the continual possibility of its
dissolution. For the psychoanalytic theory of suture, see Miller (1977). For its early usage in film theory, see Oudart
(1977) and Heath (1977). For two of the most sustained critiques of suture, see Carroll (1982) and Ẑiẑek (2012).
12
By “transcendent object,” Sartre means an object in-the-world, outside of consciousness, through which
consciousness is unified. This is consistent with his duality of consciousness-world.
10

CHAPTER 2: The More-Than-Real
1
All following citations attributed to Baudry in this chapter refer to “The Apparatus” unless otherwise noted incitation.
2
While Baudry acknowledges that “Plato’s topos does not and could not possibly correspond exactly to Freud’s,” he
nonetheless argues for the validity of applying psychoanalysis to the philosopher and “the other scene” of his
thought: “it is still more important to determine what is at work on the idealist philosopher’s discourse unknown to
him, the truth which proclaims, very different yet contained within the one he consciously articulates” (Baudry 107).
3
Put by Freud: “It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that
led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination. Instead of it, the psychical
apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the externa.l world and to endeavor to
make a real alteration in them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in
the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable” (Freud quoted
in Laplanche and Pontalis 380). As we shall see, this very hallucination, abandoned for the sake of satisfaction found
in externality, is taken up again in dream.
4
This calls to mind Lacan’s invocation of the “evil eye” as it relates to the play between eye and gaze in desire
enacted in the visual field:
In order to understand what invidia is in its function as gaze it must not be confused with jealousy. What
the small child, or whoever, envies is not at all necessarily what he might want—avoir envie, as one
improperly puts it. Who can say that the child who looks at his younger brother still needs to be at the
breast? Everyone knows that envy is usually aroused by the possession of goods which would be of no use
to the person who is envious of them, and about the true nature of which he does not have the least idea.
Such is true envy—the envy that makes the subject pale before the image of a completedness closed upon
itself, before the idea that the petit a, the separated a from which he is hanging, may be for another the
possession that gives satisfaction… (Lacan 116, emphasis mine).
5
It does well to emphasize here Lacan’s understanding of dream as a “showing,” a being-shown, rather than a
“seeing:” “…in the final resort, our position in the dream is profoundly that of someone who does not see. The
subject does not see where it is leading, he follows. He may even on occasion detach himself, tell himself that it is a
dream, but in no case will he be able to apprehend himself in the dream in the way in which, in the Cartesion cogito,
he apprehends himself as thought. He may say to himself, It’s only a dream. But he does not apprehend himself as
someone who says to himself—After all, I am the consciousness of this dream” (Lacan 75-76).
6
What we have in mind with this phrasing is what Bonitzer calls “the gestural, phonic (or rather phono-graphic),
coloured, etc., signifying network which links the circularity of specular topography with the linearity of bourgeois
narration (bourgeois first because it presents individuals on the scene, monads against a background of repressed
history, thereby reproducing, even before the question of ‘content’ is raised, bourgeois and petit bourgeois ways of
life and thought and automatically giving them an artistic, moral, metaphysical ‘value’, with a spirited volume)”
(Bonitzer 302).
7
It is not that the Absent One is within the film; the Absent One is the big Other who looks at the film: “Let us go to
the great hall of the Doges’ Palace in which are painted all kinds of battles, such as the battle of Lepanto, etc. The
social function, which was already emerging at the religious level, is now becoming clear. Who comes here? Those
who form what Retz calls ‘les peuples,’ the audiences. And what do the audiences see in those vast compositions.
They see the gaze of those persons who, when the audience are not there, deliberate in this hall. Behind the picture,
it is their gaze that is there” (Lacan 113).
8
Speaking on the belief that representations “belong” to the phenomenological subject, Lacan notes that “this
belong to me aspect of representations [is] so reminiscent of property” (Lacan 81).
9
For an exposition of historical differences in cinematic exhibition and spectatorship, see Kepley, Jr. (1996).
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AFTERWORD
1
Once again we return to the essential notion that phenomenology is not a critical theory of consciousness as
determined by structuration, but rather a seemingly innocent description. In a 2007 interview on the history of
theoretical structuralism in France, Yves Duroux explains that “the structured subject is the phenomenological
subject…it can be understood as a description of what is structured” (Duroux 191-192). Duroux (along with
Althusser and Baudry) sees “phenomenology as description (but not theory), a faithful description because it’s
blind…” (192).
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